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ABSTRACT 
To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced 
the security relationship between China and Japan?  The conventional wisdom holds that 
while the overall balance of U.S. influence has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate 
tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, Washington’s nuclear guarantees in particular have 
served to reduce tensions by helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan.  Much scholarly 
work has been dedicated to analyzing the U.S. impact on the China-Japan relationship 
generally and the prediction of increased tensions resulting from changes to the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella (namely, development of ballistic missile defense).  However, little 
attention has been paid to assessing how the magnitude and direction of U.S. influence 
have varied over time and whether the predictions of a worsening Sino-Japanese security 
dilemma have come to fruition.  Conducting a historical analysis of the period 1945–
present, this thesis finds that the influence of U.S. extended deterrence is more nuanced.  
While the strongest influence has been to ameliorate long-term hostilities, the influence 
most frequently felt was exacerbation of short-term tensions.  This influence 
notwithstanding, this thesis finds that changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan have 
infrequently been associated with changes in the China-Japan security relationship. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis endeavors to answer the question: To what extent has the United 
States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced the security relationship between 
China and Japan?  This thesis assesses whether U.S. actions have ameliorated or 
exacerbated the severity of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma and how that influence 
has varied over time.   
While the China-Japan security relationship is at least the sum of Sino-Japanese 
interactions, there is also a qualitative nature to it which forms the context within which 
these interactions take place.  The conventional wisdom holds that while the overall 
balance of U.S. influence has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate tensions between 
Tokyo and Beijing, Washington’s nuclear guarantees in particular have served to reduce 
tensions by helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan.  Recent changes in the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella—in particular, ballistic missile defense (BMD)—are expected to 
exacerbate the security dilemma between China and Japan.  By evaluating policy 
documents and statements by government officials, as well as analyzing quantitative and 
qualitative changes in military postures among all three nations, this thesis assesses 
whether and how the security relationship between China and Japan has been influenced 
by changes to U.S. nuclear posture. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The China-Japan-United States triangle is one of the most important and complex 
regional, trilateral relationships.  These nations are the three largest economies and, with 
Germany, four largest exporters and importers in the world.1
                                                 
1 World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2008,” 
    They carry great political 
weight in a region characterized by instability, with tensions ranging from nuclear 
proliferation to the reunification of two nations divided since the end of World War II.  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010); 
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2009 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2009). 
 2 
The United States has the most technologically advanced military in the world, Japan is 
slowly increasing the role of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in international affairs, and 
China is continuing to rapidly modernize what is already the world’s largest armed force, 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
Interstate relationships are, like interpersonal relationships, immensely complex.2
The mutual suspicion and uncertainty of motives between Beijing and Tokyo 
means that even if both sides were to pursue purely defensive capabilities, there would 
nevertheless exist the potential for a Sino-Japanese arms race, or even the possibility of 
outright war.  Such a situation could have several negative consequences, not the least of 
which could entail U.S. entry into the conflict through the mechanism of the long-
standing U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST), thus pitting the United States in a 
war against China.  To the degree that U.S. policy may have driven or prevented this 
conflict, it is important to understand the extent of U.S. influence in Sino-Japanese 
security relations. 
  
On the one hand is a (relatively) simple matter of what each party does to the other, or 
how one reacts to actions by the other.  On the other hand is a very subjective assessment 
of the quality or character of the relationship.  Are the two parties friends, enemies, or 
mutually ignorant of each other?  It is in this qualitative sense that the China-Japan 
security relationship is especially complex.  Even in the pre-1972 absence of formal 
diplomatic recognition, the informal ties and significant bilateral trade would indicate that 
neither Tokyo nor Beijing ignored the other.  China and Japan could hardly be described 
as enemies—they have had formal diplomatic relations for forty years, carry on extensive 
economic trade, and cooperate on some important regional security issues, most notably 
the Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program.  Yet, the Sino-Japanese security 
relationship is not always one that could be described as amicable.  China and Japan have 
a long-standing historical animosity, in addition to mutual suspicions about the other’s 
military buildup.  As will be discussed in Section E of this chapter, both a long-term and 
short-term qualitative evaluation must be made. 
                                                 
2 I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professors Huntley and Weiner and their various analogies to 
interpersonal relationships for their assistance in helping me conceptualize this paragraph. 
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There is a consensus that the overall balance of the United States’ influence, 
through its alliance with Japan, has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate the severity of 
the security dilemma between China and Japan.  Understanding the extent of U.S. 
influence—“how much” of an impact the United States has had—will help policymakers 
in Washington appreciate the security dynamic between Beijing and Tokyo.  If U.S. 
actions have tended to ameliorate the security dilemma between China and Japan, 
policymakers could rely on similar actions as a damper on Sino-Japanese tension.  If, 
however, the impact of U.S. actions has been to exacerbate the security dilemma, causing 
one or the other party to take increasingly provocative steps, policymakers could consider 
alternatives to such actions.  A third contingency, that the United States has no 
appreciable influence in the China-Japan security relationship, must not be discounted. 
This thesis will use the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a lens for analyzing U.S. 
influence on the Sino-Japanese security relationship.  Nuclear deterrence is an aspect of 
trilateral relations of an enduring nature, spanning from the depths of the Cold War to the 
present day.  At the same time, while long-lasting, it has not been monolithic, evolving to 
include not just deterrence of nuclear attack but also the possibility of defending against 
missiles after they have been launched. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are several specific aspects to consider in assessing the extent to which the 
United States has influenced the Sino-Japanese security relationship.  The first is whether 
the balance of U.S. influence has done more to ameliorate or exacerbate the security 
dilemma between Japan and China.  The second is whether that influence has remained 
constant or has changed over time.  The influence of the United States could be broken 
down into two components: direction (i.e., amelioration or exacerbation) and magnitude 
(i.e., how much influence does the United States exert).   
This thesis hypothesizes that both the direction and magnitude of U.S. influence 
have varied over time.  Broadly speaking, the influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has 
shifted from having a general effect of amelioration during the Cold War, toward a 
general effect of exacerbation in the post-Cold War, and especially post-9/11, era.  While 
 4 
the United States applied pressure on Japan throughout the 1950s and 1960s to maintain a 
united front against the perceived monolithic Communist bloc of China and the Soviet 
Union should have exacerbated tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the situation was 
ameliorated through the impact of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, obviating the need for Japan 
to develop an indigenous nuclear force.  Beginning with Sino-American (and Sino-
Japanese) rapprochement in 1972, U.S. interactions with China and Japan created 
conditions that allowed Tokyo and Beijing to warm up to each other and thus further 
ameliorate the security dilemma, despite the enduring controversies of history and 
territorial conflicts.  With the end of the Cold War, the United States took steps to 
redefine and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, encouraging Japan to assume a more 
prominent (military) role in international affairs generally and alliance activities 
specifically.  The inclusion of missile defense into the broader U.S. strategic deterrence 
led to Japan’s joint development of missile defense programs, raising Beijing’s fear about 
new-found militarism in Tokyo and thus exacerbating the Sino-Japanese security 
dilemma. 
This thesis further hypothesizes that the magnitude of U.S. influence has followed 
a more muddled path.  Broadly speaking, Washington’s influence in Tokyo and Beijing 
are inversely related.  During the early part of the Cold War, the United States had great 
influence in Japan and very little in China.  Following Sino-American rapprochement and 
normalization, the United States gained more influence in China; the cost, however, was 
influence with Japan, as Tokyo and Beijing themselves grew closer.  Following the end 
of the Cold War, trilateral relations were significantly altered.  Without a mutual Soviet 
enemy and as a consequence of post-Tiananmen sanctions, the United States lost what 
little influence it had in Beijing; changes in Japanese domestic politics led to Tokyo 
pushing for increased foreign policy independence from Washington.  By the mid-1990s, 
however, Japanese policymakers had a more uncertain assessment of their own national 
security, allowing the United States to exert more influence through the mechanism of the 
alliance.  This influence increased greatly following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks on the United States, while strained relations with Beijing meant that Washington 
continued to have little influence over Chinese policy. 
 5 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The security dilemma is the mechanism by which “trying to increase one’s 
security can actually decrease it.”3
[I]n an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two 
or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and 
defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats.  
This can lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional 
tensions, reducing security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about 
the danger of one’s security environment.
  This is because:  
4
The potential thus exists for defensive actions by China or Japan to cause increasing 
tension between the two.  There is a consensus in the literature that the broad pattern of 
Cold War-era U.S. influence in Sino-Japanese relations has been to at once ameliorate 
and exacerbate the security dilemma.  From the Chinese perspective, while the U.S.-
Japan alliance was an integral part of the American strategy to contain to Communist 
bloc—which included China—the alliance also served to prevent the post-World War II 
remilitarization of Japan.
   
5  For Japan, concerns of attack (while primarily envisioned as 
from the Soviet Union) were assuaged by the large U.S. military presence in Japan; 
Tokyo needed neither its own military force nor nuclear weapons as its security was 
provided in large part by Washington.6
                                                 
3 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January, 1978), 
182. 
  Thus, most analysts agree that, to the extent that 
4 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring, 1999), 49–50. 
5 Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter, 2005), 119; Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 58–
60; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance,” Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (April, 1997), 385; Robert S. Ross, Managing a Changing Relationship: 
China’s Japan Policy in the 1990s (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 1996), 8. 
6 James L. Schoff, Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended 
Deterrence (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009), 26–7; Richard J. Samuels, 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2007), 39–44; David Arase, “Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy After 9/11,” Asian Survey 47, 
no. 4 (July–August, 2007), 562; Thomas U. Berger, “Japan’s International Relations: The Political and 
Security Dimensions,” in The International Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 140–2; Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron Or Coming Soon?,” The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter, 2002), 69. 
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Japan did not take steps to rearm, conventionally or with nuclear weapons, the U.S. 
influence during the Cold War had an ameliorative effect. 
Reflecting the strategic ambiguity of the post-Cold War era, the literature divides 
on the state of the China-Japan security relationship and the U.S. role in the post-Cold 
War era.  Thomas Christensen, T.J. Pempel, and others believe that, at least in the early 
1990s, the situation between Japan and China changed little, with U.S. influence 
continuing to balance between amelioration and exacerbation.7  Around the middle of the 
decade, however, things changed.  While the United States was already taking steps to 
strengthen its alliance with Japan (such as issuing revised cooperation guidelines which 
increased the missions and geographic area within which the SDF could operate in non-
combat support of U.S. forces), the greatest shift came with Tokyo’s acquiescence to 
joint American-Japanese development of a BMD system with Washington following 
North Korea’s 1998 test of a Taepodong-1 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).8  
China became more militarily assertive to dampen Taiwan’s increased leanings toward 
independence, and Beijing increased the pace of its ballistic missile modernization 
program.9
                                                 
7 T. J. Pempel, “Japan: Divided Government, Diminished Resources,” in Strategic Asia 2008–09: 
Challenges and Choices, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo and Andrew Marble (Seattle, WA: The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 111; Frances Rosenbluth, Jun Saito and Annalisa Zinn, “America’s 
Policy Toward East Asia: How it Looks from Japan,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July–August, 2007), 586; 
Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 58; Ross, 8.  Danielle Cohen argues that tensions between 
China and Japan subsided in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, based on a Chinese estimation 
that the United States would become less influential in a new, multipolar world; this view was countered by 
the overwhelming U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  See Danielle F. S. Cohen, Retracing the 
Triangle: China’s Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the Post-Cold War Era (Baltimore, MD: University of 
Maryland School of Law, 2005), 18–20. 
 
8 Nick Bisley, “Securing the ‘Anchor of Regional Stability’?: The Transformation of the US-Japan 
Alliance and East Asian Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008), 75–6; Arase, 567–8; 
Samuels, 68–9, 82, 104; Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 59–61, 64; Garrett and Glaser, 
“Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 389–90; Ross, 8–9.  While the 
literature refers to programs such as theater missile defense (TMD, for defense of Japan) or national missile 
defense (NMD, defending the United States), I refer to them collectively as ballistic missile defense, or 
simply, missile defense programs. 
9 Schoff, 11; Christopher W. Hughes, Sino-Japanese Relations and Ballistic Missile Defence 
(Warwick, UK: Center for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, 2001), 15; Thomas J. 
Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn, 2002), 12–4; Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 61–2; Garrett 
and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 394. 
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The literature is virtually unanimous in identifying the year 2001 as pivotal in the 
U.S.-China-Japan triangle.  The George W. Bush Administration came into office with 
clear plans to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, and was predisposed to viewing China 
as a “strategic competitor.”  The Bush Administration placed particular emphasis on 
development of land- and sea-based BMD systems both with North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) nations in the West and Japan in the East.  In the context of 
Japanese support for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, most analysts argue not 
only that Sino-Japanese relations took a drastic turn toward tension and mutual suspicion, 
but that the United States was a primary driver in that change.10  There are a few 
dissenting opinions; several notable scholars claim that Bush’s second term took a more 
pragmatic, conciliatory approach toward China,11 while others point out that nationalist 
trends in Japanese politics have at least as much to do with worsening relations between 
Tokyo and Beijing.12
Much scholarly work has been dedicated to analyzing the U.S. impact on the 
China-Japan relationship generally and the prediction of increased tensions resulting from 
changes to the U.S. nuclear umbrella (namely, development of BMD).  However, little 
attention has been paid in the literature to assessing how the magnitude and direction of 
U.S. influence have varied over time and whether the predictions of a worsening Sino-
Japanese security dilemma have come to fruition.  This thesis attempts, in small part, to 
fill that void. 
  None of these authors, however, argue against the consensus that 
changes to Washington’s deterrent strategy, especially U.S.-Japan cooperation on BMD, 
have served to exacerbate tensions between China and Japan.   
                                                 
10 Bisley, 79–81; Pempel, 112–3, 132; Arase, 570–2; Rosenbluth, Saito and Zinn, 587–8; Samuels, 
99–103; Wu, 120–1; Berger, “Japan’s International Relations,” 156–7; Christensen, “The Contemporary 
Security Dilemma,” 14–5; Gaye Christoffersen, “The Role of East Asia in Sino-American Relations,” 
Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (May–June, 2002), 371–2. 
11 See, for example, Pempel, 126, 128–9; Victor D. Cha, “Winning Asia: Washington’s Untold 
Success Story,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (November–December, 2007), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58454/victor-d-cha/winning-asia (accessed May 14, 2010); 
Rosenbluth, Saito and Zinn, 587. 
12 This is essentially the whole of Arase’s argument in “Japan, The Active State?”  See also Pempel, 
121, 123–5; Samuels, esp. chapter 5. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis conducts an historical analysis to assess how the magnitude and 
direction of U.S. influence have varied overtime.  The broad periods of analysis will be 
the early Cold War (roughly, 1945–1969), from Sino-American and Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement to the end of the Cold War (1969–1991), from the end of the Cold War to 
the September 11 attacks (1989–2001), and from September 11 to the present.  Timelines 
are constructed comparing Japanese, Chinese, and U.S. actions, statements, and changes 
in military posture over time.  This will assist in the analysis of how China and Japan 
have responded to each other, and whether U.S. actions had an influence on that 
response.  Although the correlation (or non-correlation) of U.S. actions with changes in 
the China-Japan relationship will likely be easy to identify, determining whether the 
United States caused those changes will be more difficult to assess.  To the extent 
possible, changes in Sino-Japanese tensions caused largely by factors other than the 
United States (for example, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine) will 
be identified and excluded from the analysis. 
There are, of course, shortcomings in the use of these historical markers.  The 
“end of the Cold War” was not a definitive moment as much as it was a process; the 
events of September 11, 2001, themselves likely had little impact on trilateral strategic 
relations.  It would be difficult, however, if not impossible to separate U.S. nuclear 
strategy in East Asia from either the broad historical trend of the Cold War or the context 
of post-9/11 U.S. security posture.  The events chosen to demarcate these broad historical 
eras are admittedly not perfect, and are intended as a convenient tool for analysis. 
A few definitions require explication for the purposes of this thesis.  U.S. 
influence is considered to be the interaction of both direct, intentional efforts to influence 
an actor (such as pressure applied on Tokyo through the U.S.-Japan alliance) and more 
indirect (and perhaps unintended) consequences of U.S. actions.13
                                                 
13 An example of this indirect influence, though not specifically related to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, 
would be the impact of Sino-American normalization (nominally unrelated to Japan) in encouraging Tokyo 
to pursue its own program of normalization with Beijing.  See, for example, Morton H. Halperin, “America 
and Asia: The Impact of Nixon’s China Policy,” in Sino-American Relations, 1949–1971, ed. Roderick 
MacFarquhar (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 3–20. 
  The following 
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indicators of influence are used.  Using either unilateral or (or, in the case of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, bilateral) actions or governmental statements as a starting point, it will 
note the other party’s reaction.  This reaction is expected to take one (or both) of two 
forms: a rebuttal statement or, more importantly, a significant change in military posture.   
While the terms “nuclear umbrella” or “nuclear guarantee” typically refer to the 
doctrine of extended deterrence, this thesis considers four different definitions or scopes 
for the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  The strictest definition pertains to the U.S. guarantee to 
use nuclear weapons in order to deter or defend against an attack on Japan only.  An 
expanded definition encompasses such a guarantee to any nation or group of nations.  An 
even broader definition incorporates BMD; while some may consider “defense” to be 
distinct from “deterrence,” the ability to defend against an incoming missile attack can 
itself serve to deter an adversary from initiating an attack in the first place, and thus is in 
keeping with U.S. promises to protect against nuclear attacks.14
As discussed earlier, evaluating the quality of the Sino-Japanese security 
relationship is complex.  On the one hand is the long-term, “strategic” nature of the 
relationship, whether friends, enemies, or mutually ignorant (i.e., no formal 
  A fourth definition is 
briefly considered: the actual use of nuclear weapons in constituting an existential 
deterrent.  In measuring changes to the U.S. nuclear guarantee, indications of the strength 
or degree of this guarantee will include (1) the materiel required to effectively have a 
deterrent capability, (2) changes in the object of the deterrent, and (3) statements which 
go to the credibility of the deterrent.  The measurement of U.S. influence is necessarily 
subjective, with magnitudes ranging from none, to little, to moderate and perhaps 
significant; direction will be measured in terms of ameliorating or exacerbating security 
dilemma dynamics between China and Japan. 
                                                 
14 Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett, “Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 
Problems of Communism 35, no. 2 (March–April, 1986), 36.  More recently, President Bush incorporated 
missile defense as a component of deterrence in his speech on BMD; see George W. Bush, “Remarks at the 
National Defense University, May 1, 2001,” in American Presidency Project, ed. John T. Woolley and 
Gerhard Peters (Santa Barbara, CA: University of California, 2010), 




  On the other hand is the more short-term state of the relationship, which 
can be one of either cooperation or conflict.  Thus states, as with people, can have 
varying degrees of relationships: long-time friends occasionally fight, just as sworn 
enemies might sometimes get along for a short time.  As a tool of convenience, this thesis 
uses the classification scheme in Figure 1 for describing both the long-term and short-
term nature of the China-Japan security relationship at a given point in time. Because 
security is more encompassing than just the military balance between two countries, the 
indicators of variation in the China-Japan security relationship will include (1) political 
interactions (for example, statements or rhetoric, visits by dignitaries, or bilateral 
summits); (2) economic interaction; and (3) military interaction, be it cooperation or 
more of an arms race dynamic. 
  Short-Term 






 Friends Cooperative Friends 
Feuding  
Friends 
Ignorant Tacit Friends 
Tacit 
Enemies 
Enemies Amicable  Enemies 
Hostile  
Enemies 
Figure 1.   Classification of interstate relationships 
The sources used for this thesis are varied.  Primary sources include Chinese, 
Japanese, and U.S. defense posture statements, white papers, and other materials related 
to military postures; unilateral or bilateral statements (both formal, diplomatic documents 
and more informal comments by government officials); and the various iterations of U.S.-
Japan joint defense guidelines.  Because the author reads neither Chinese nor Japanese, 
significant reliance is placed on translated documents, as well as secondary sources 
                                                 
15 It is acknowledged that this is not a perfect scheme, and the author makes no claim of this 
classification being able to completely describe the strategic relationship between states.  Any such claim 
would quickly be refuted by a cursory study of the U.S.-USSR relationship during the Cold War: they were 
not enemies (as they did not engage each other directly in combat); they were not ignorant (as they 
maintained diplomatic relations for the entirety of the Cold War); but in no case could they be considered 
“friends,” at least not in the conventional sense of the term.  In any event, for the relationship under 
examination here, this categorization of long-term trends is adequate, if imperfect. 
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comprised of scholarly analysis on U.S.-China-Japan relations.  In addition, limited use 
of periodicals is made throughout the thesis, but especially in sections dealing with the 
post-9/11 era. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into six main sections, of which this introduction is the 
first.  The second analyzes the period of the early Cold War (roughly 1945–1969), with 
emphasis given to the development of China’s nuclear weapons program and the 
evolution of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan.  The third section covers the period 
from Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement to the end of the Cold War 
(roughly 1969–1989).  Particular attention is paid to the impact of Sino-American 
normalization, as well as maintenance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and assessment of 
any proposed Japanese involvement in the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI).  The fourth section analyzes the period from the end of the Cold War 
until the September 11 terrorist attacks (1989–2001).  In this section, specific attention is 
given to the United States’ post-Cold War nuclear posture, the status of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, and the beginnings of the BMD program.  In the fifth section, analysis focuses 
on the post-9/11 era.  Attention to the Bush Administration’s war on terror is limited 
mostly to its direct impact on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China relations; most of this section 
focuses on the impacts of the accelerated BMD program and trilateral reactions to North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  The last section summarizes the thesis’ findings and 
attempts to draw some policy implications. 
 12 
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II. THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945–1969 
The period from 1945 to 1969 witnessed the formulation and coalescing of the 
initial Cold War relationship between the United States, Japan, and China.  During this 
time, Beijing and Tokyo went from a state of open war to a more ambiguous relationship.  
The United States’ nuclear deterrent also saw significant change during this period, 
growing from a handful of weapons perceived to be simply more effective artillery 
pieces, into a vast strategic deterrent against attacks not only on American soil, but on 
American friends and allies as well.   
Tracing the evolution of the nuclear umbrella as well as the course of the China-
Japan relationship, this chapter will demonstrate that the Eisenhower Administration’s 
threat to use nuclear weapons over Communist Chinese advances in the Taiwan Strait led 
to the development of a Chinese nuclear weapons program.  This project, once 
consummated by the detonation of a nuclear device in 1964, caused increased Sino-
Japanese tensions, leading Tokyo to petition Washington for explicit protection under the 
nuclear umbrella.  
A. ENDING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
1. Hiroshima and Japan’s Surrender 
On August 6, 1945, when the United States opened the nuclear age to public 
minds by dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the relationship between China and 
Japan was that of hostile enemies in the midst of their ninth year of war.16  On August 
15, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender, which was formalized on board USS 
Missouri on September 2.  At this point, Japan lost its sovereignty, and its relationship 
with China became one of ignorant enemies—no diplomatic relations and still 
characterized by a state of war between them.17
                                                 
16 In a technical sense, the nuclear age began with the July 17, 1945, “Trinity” test at Los Alamos, 
New Mexico.  Because of the tremendous secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, however, it is 
unlikely that any nation would have been influenced by the U.S. nuclear program before Hiroshima. 
 
17 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 211–2. 
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It is frequently argued that the United States’ bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was the proximate cause of Japan’s surrender, and thus one could argue that the 
budding U.S. nuclear capability led to the change in Sino-Japanese relations from hostile 
to ignorant.  This is not, however, a foregone conclusion; some scholars suggest that the 
entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific theater had at least as much influence on 
Japan’s surrender as did the nuclear bombings.  What is more, by the summer of 1945 it 
was obvious that Japan was eventually going to lose the war, it was but a matter of 
when.18
2. Allied Occupation and the San Francisco Treaties 
  In a sense, then, Sino-Japanese tensions were going to be ameliorated regardless 
of whether the United States used the atomic bomb.  Would the nature of relations 
between China and Japan have been different if the war had ended in February 1946 
instead of September 1945?  In the context of this thesis the answer is, likely not; as 
demonstrated below, the relationship between Japan and China languished in ambiguity 
for decades, and so a difference of six more months of war would probably not have 
made much of a difference (of course, it is impossible to know what else might have 
occurred during that time, or whether Japan would have capitulated in the face of Soviet 
entry into the war).  Nevertheless, if U.S. nuclear deterrence is interpreted in the broadest 
sense—to include actual weapons employment—then it had a significant effect of 
ameliorating Sino-Japanese tensions by helping to end the state of war between them. 
The Allied occupation of Japan began on September 2, 1945, with the signing of 
the Japanese instrument of surrender.  Over the ensuing five years, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) set about the task of completely demilitarizing 
Japan.  The staff of General Douglas MacArthur drafted a new constitution for Japan, 
which was formally adopted by the Diet and promulgated by the Emperor on November 
3, 1946.19
                                                 
18 Pyle, 209. 
  It is often referred to as the “Peace Constitution” for its Article 9, the now-
famous “renunciation of war” clause: 
19 James E. Auer, “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 
‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World,” Law and Contemporary Problems 53, no. 2 
(Spring, 1990), 167–7; Constitution of Japan, November 3, 1946, National Diet Library, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2 (accessed July 31, 2009). 
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.20
The complete demilitarization of Japan progressed apace until the outbreak of the 
Korean War, at which point many U.S. troops present in Japan were sent to the peninsula 
and American officials began rethinking the policy of a Japan with absolutely no armed 
forces.
 
21  By this point, however, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had already 
set Japan on a course of economic expansion at the expense of military reconstruction, a 
concept which endures to this day as the Yoshida Doctrine.22  Negotiations between 
SCAP and the Yoshida cabinet resulted in the creation of the National Police Reserve 
Force in July 1950 to maintain Japanese domestic security in the absence of the U.S. 
occupation forces; this evolved into the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954.23  While this 
resolved the immediate issue of Japanese security, a long-term solution would be needed 
to the simultaneous problem of allowing American access to Japanese bases while not 
relying on American forces alone to defend Japan.  The answer was a two-step process of 
restoring Japan’s sovereignty and then signing a security treaty between Washington and 
Tokyo.  Both steps were carried out on September 8, 1951, with the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Peace with Japan (the Treaty of San Francisco), immediately followed by the 
signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United 
States (the Mutual Security Treaty, or MST).24
As the first step in the process, the Treaty of San Francisco formally ended the 
state of war between Japan and forty-eight other nations, ended the Allied occupation, 
and restored full sovereignty to Japan.  Notably absent from the peace negotiations or the 
 
                                                 
20 Constitution of Japan. 
21 Pyle, 219–20; Samuels, 45–6. 
22 For an excellent treatment of the Yoshida Doctrine, see Samuels, 29–59, and Pyle, 237–77. 
23 Samuels, 46. 
24 Pyle, 319; James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2002), 557. 
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signing of the treaty was a representative from China.  Following the Japanese surrender 
in 1945, the dormant rivalry in China between the Chinese Nationalist Party (the 
Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) erupted into full-blown 
civil war.  On October 1, 1949, the Communists under Mao Zedong declared the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and by December the 
Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek had taken up exile on Taiwan, with both 
governments claiming to be the legal government of a single Chinese state.25  Owing to 
this ambiguous situation, the United States and the United Kingdom could not agree on 
which representative to invite to the San Francisco negotiations, and as a result the state 
of war between China and Japan remained after September 1951.26
The second step was the signing of the MST between Washington and a newly-
sovereign Tokyo.  The treaty permits the United States to not only “maintain armed 
forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan,” but also to 
utilize those forces “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security 
in the Far East.”
   
27
The government in Beijing regarded the Treaty of San Francisco, the MST, and 
the 1952 Treaty of Taipei (ending the state of war between Japan and the government it 




  The language of the treaty is not as strong as that of the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1947, or the successor MST concluded in 1960; although the United 
States is implicitly called to defend Japan, there is no explicit mechanism by which this is 
to take place; nuclear weapons were not mentioned implicitly or explicitly.  Nevertheless, 
if we construct the U.S. deterrent more broadly than nuclear weapons, we can consider 
the origins of that deterrent to Japan as having begun on September 8, 1951.  
                                                 
25 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 619–
643, passim. 
26 McClain, 557, 608. 
27 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, September 8, 1951, Avalon Project, Yale 
Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th)century/japan001.asp (accessed October 8, 2010). 
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resurgent Japanese militarism, and declared that the technical state of war would remain 
between Beijing and Tokyo.28
B. EVOLUTION OF U.S. DETERRENT STRATEGY 
  The Sino-Japanese relationship thus remained that of tacit 
enemies. 
The debate over nuclear doctrine in the United States began almost as soon as the 
Trinity test had been concluded.  Some scientists, military leaders, and political decision-
makers argued that nuclear weapons were just another artillery piece, certainly more 
evolved but also as available for use as any other weapon might be; others argued that, by 
virtue of its unprecedented destructive force, nuclear devices should be seen as a weapon 
of last resort.29  This debate was not fully resolved by the time of the Korean War, 
opening the Truman Administration to significant internal debate—which sometimes 
leaked to the public, perhaps most famously when General MacArthur advocated the use 
of nuclear weapons against Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula.30  The debate was 
further complicated when the Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon in August 1949, 
ending the United States’ “nuclear monopoly” and introducing the beginning of nuclear 
deterrence theory.31
1. The “New Look” and the Birth of Extended Deterrence 
 
Shortly after the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, the still-new President 
Eisenhower directed a review of U.S. security strategy generally, and nuclear strategy in 
particular.  The result was a classified memorandum, NSC 16/2, which laid out the 
administration’s basic national security policy, including a significant reliance on nuclear 
weapons and a concomitant reduction in the need for large numbers of conventional 
                                                 
28 Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political 
Decision-Making (London: Routledge, 1998), 43; Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 102. 
29 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 48–
53. 
30 Freedman, 71–2, 89. 
31 Freedman, 56–8. 
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forces.32  This policy was announced publicly during Eisenhower’s State of the Union 
address in January 1954, introducing his “New Look” for defense; his Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, later expounded on the concept that came to be known as “massive 
retaliation.”33  The doctrine of massive retaliation—essentially, the use of nuclear 
weapons in response to any aggression, even if by conventional means—was intended 
mostly to counter the threat in Europe, where the Soviets had overwhelming conventional 
superiority over America’s allies (even if one took into account the U.S. forces based in 
Europe).34
Although massive retaliation and the nascent nuclear umbrella were designed with 
Europe in mind, it was soon exported to Asia.  As early as January 1953 Eisenhower had 
suggested his willingness to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War, a threat which 
Secretary of State Dulles attempted to communicate to the Chinese in May.
  While not explicitly called “extended deterrence,” the New Look and massive 
retaliation were essentially the beginning of the United States providing a nuclear 
umbrella to its friends and allies. 
35  In 
September and December 1953, and again in March 1954, Dulles intimated that 
Washington might use nuclear weapons in the context of the crisis in Indochina.  The 
United States again suggested a willingness to use nuclear weapons during conflict in the 
midst of the Geneva conference on Indochina from April to July 1954.36
The earliest explicit notion of extended deterrence in Asia came during the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.  The crisis began on September 3, 1954, when the PLA began 
shelling the KMT-controlled islands of Quemoy and Matsu.  The Chinese logic behind 
   
                                                 
32 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), 6. 
33 Lewis and Xue, 17. 
34 James J. Wirtz, “United States: Nuclear Policy at a Crossroads,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear 
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 112; Freedman, 71, 86–7.  
35 John Gittings, The World and China, 1922–1972 (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 203; Lewis 
and Xue, 13–4.  Lewis and Xue report that Dulles communicated a threat to use nuclear weapons against 
China during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Nehru.  Dulles assumed that the threat would be 
forwarded to Mao, but Nehru “later denied that he had grasped the intent of the Dulles communication, and 
in any case had not transmitted any atomic threat to Beijing.” 
36 Lewis and Xue, 18–9; Gittings, 203. 
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this action is not of consequence to this thesis; what is important is the action-reaction 
cycle of the United States and China.  The crisis started on the eve of the Manila 
Conference to negotiate a Southeast Asian mutual defense treaty, which had the effect of 
validating the need for such an agreement amongst the potential allies.37  It also 
encouraged Washington to accelerate plans for a separate treaty with Taipei, which was 
signed on December 2, 1954.38  This was followed shortly by public statements from 
various administration officials, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Arthur Radford, declaring the will of the United States to use nuclear weapons in meeting 
its treaty obligations to Taiwan.39  The Formosa Resolution of January 29, 1955, gave 
President Eisenhower the legal authorization he needed to use U.S. armed forces to 
defend Taiwan against attack, which Dulles and Eisenhower reiterated in March included 
the use of nuclear weapons.  Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against 
Beijing was again emphasized by President Eisenhower in September 1958, during the 
second Taiwan Strait crisis. 40
We thus see that by early 1955, the United States had adopted a policy of using its 
nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack upon its allies.  
Although not explicitly directed to the U.S.-Japan alliance—indeed, in April 1954 the 




2. “Flexible Response” 
—the initial development of a nuclear umbrella is 
nevertheless significant for the reaction it sparked in Beijing. 
When the Kennedy administration entered office in 1961 it was already wary of 
the doctrine of massive retaliation because it provided little recourse other than a global 
nuclear war.  These fears were underscored during the Berlin Crisis of October 1961, 
when it became obvious that additional steps were required on the ladder of escalation.  
                                                 
37 Lewis and Xue, 24. 
38 Lewis and Xue, 20–1. 
39 Lewis and Xue, 32. 
40 Lewis and Xue, 37, 40; Gittings, 203. 
41 Kamiya, 64. 
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The result was doctrine of “flexible response,” introduced by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in 1962.  Reversing the trends of the Eisenhower era, flexible 
response called for maintaining a credible strategic nuclear capability but also increasing 
the United States’ (and allies’) conventional forces.  The practical result of this shift was 
that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which had grown to include over 1700 ICBMs 
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by the mid-1960s, would remain at a 
constant size until the 1980s.42
Flexible response was directed mainly at Washington’s allies in Europe; in fact, it 
took NATO until 1967 to formally adopt the policy into alliance doctrine over fears of 
“decoupling” U.S. security from that of Europe.
 
43  For Tokyo, flexible response was less 
significant at this juncture; not only had the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan not yet 
been explicated, but at this point the Diet was continuing to advocate the abolition of all 
nuclear weapons.  The question of credibility that was attendant the introduction of 
flexible response thus had little impact on U.S.-Japan relations and, by extension, the 
Japan-China relationship.44
C. EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
When discussing China and nuclear weapons, the first thing which often comes to 
mind is Mao Zedong’s now-famous denunciation of nuclear weapons as a “paper 
tiger.”45
                                                 
42 Freedman, 228, 285–6, 297. 
  Although sometimes considered naïve, one must put his comment in the context 
of his experience during the Sino-Japanese war; while nuclear weapons could handily 
destroy China’s small industrial capacity and the millions of people living in its urban 
centers, they would be almost useless against the other billion or so Chinese who would 
retreat to the more rural provinces and wage a protracted, guerilla war (much as the 
Communists 
43 Freedman, 285–6. 
44 Nakanishi Terumasa, “Extended deterrence: The historical path and its nature,” in Strategic 
theoretical analysis on East-West relations, ed. Sato Seizaburo (Tokyo: Japan Institute for International 
Affairs, 1990), tr. by and cited in Schoff, 32. 
45 Lewis and Xue, 6; Freedman, 274. 
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had done in the Sino-Japanese War).  Mao’s point was that nuclear weapons would be 
unable to compel a Chinese capitulation in the same way that it would utterly destroy the 
societies of Western Europe.46
This did not mean that Mao and the Chinese Politburo were immune to nuclear 
threats.  As Washington increasingly indicated its willingness to use nuclear weapons in 
Asian conflicts, leadership in Beijing quickly arrived at the conclusion that the best 
defense against a nuclear weapon was another nuclear weapon.  Mao thus declared, 
during an expanded meeting of the Party Secretariat on January 15, 1955, that China 
would “‘immediately devote major efforts to developing atomic energy research’ for 
military purposes.”
 
47  By the end of 1955 the major scientific research and industrial 
arms required for producing nuclear weapons were in place; in early 1956 a strategic 
missile program was started in order to develop a delivery vehicle for its future nuclear 
weapons.48
In the early years of the Chinese nuclear program, significant assistance was 
provided by the Soviet Union.  This officially started on January 17, 1955 (only two days 
after Mao first decided to pursue nuclear weapons) with a Soviet announcement of 
supporting any socialist nation’s research into “peaceful uses of atomic energy.”
 
49
                                                 
46 Lewis and Xue, 329; Freedman, 274–5. 
  By 
the middle of 1956 Moscow’s assistance to Beijing had been manifested in rubles, 
people, and materiel, with Soviet scientists supervising Chinese scientists operating a 
Soviet-donated reactor, inside a Soviet-designed and constructed laboratory.  The 
Chinese asked, and the Soviets readily supplied, for technical documents and blueprints 
for almost all aspects of their nuclear program—with the exception of a prototype 
weapon itself.  Moscow had, at least in principle, agreed to provide a prototype nuclear 
device at some point during the development process.  By early 1958, however, the 
Soviet Politburo began expressing reservations about Mao’s view of atomic warfare and 
47 Lewis and Xue, 38. 
48 Lewis and Xue, 48–50. 
49 Lewis and Xue, 40–1. 
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the wisdom of continuing Soviet assistance.  Rather than flat-out renege on an agreement 
with their comrades in Beijing, Moscow instead took the slow-roll approach, first 
insisting on a never-ending series of security improvements to the proposed laboratory in 
China, then using the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) negotiations in Geneva as an 
excuse to delay not only the prototype, but also blueprints and other technical data.50  By 
late 1959, Soviet scientists had begun travelling home on a few weeks’ “furlough,” but 
never returned, and by August 1960 Moscow had recalled all of its technical experts from 
Beijing’s strategic nuclear program.51
While Beijing was building its nuclear weapons program, it simultaneously 
maintained a steady stream of anti-nuclear weapon rhetoric.  In the two days following 
Mao’s nuclear decision, the PRC released at least two statements decrying the United 
States’ “brandishing” of nuclear weapons in its Asia policy.
  If China wanted nuclear weapons, it would have 
to go it alone. 
52  Following the Sino-Soviet 
split, the USSR also became a target of Chinese anti-nuclear rhetoric, claiming Soviet use 
of “nuclear blackmail to intimidate the people of the socialist countries.”53  At the tenth 
World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs—held in August 1964, mere 
months before China’s first nuclear test—the delegation from Beijing took the 
opportunity to decry nuclear weapons and even the previous year’s PTBT as “favorable 
to nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail by nuclear powers and the U.S. 
imperialism.”54
China’s first nuclear test took place at 3:00 pm on October 16, 1964.
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detonation.  The statement included two important emphases.  First, China “solemnly 
declare[d] that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use 
nuclear weapons.”56  Thus, China’s no-first-use (NFU) policy dates to the very day that it 
became a nuclear power.  Perhaps more significant, if not for the declaration itself than 
for the frequency with which it is mentioned, was the claim that China’s nuclear weapons 
program was initiated “under compulsion” in order to respond to “ever-increasing nuclear 
threats from the United States” and the “U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and 
nuclear threats,” and to “[protect] the Chinese people from U.S. threats to launch a 
nuclear war.”57
D. JAPAN SEEKS SHELTER UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA 
  Zhou’s statement thus made clear that China’s nuclear program was 
launched in response to the U.S. nuclear guarantees expressed over the preceding decade. 
The detonation of a nuclear weapon by China almost immediately raised concerns 
in Japan, reinforcing the “tacit enemies” character of the Sino-Japanese relationship.  To 
the extent that Zhou Enlai’s statement could be taken at face value, Beijing’s nascent 
nuclear deterrent was directed against Washington, not Tokyo.  But part of Japan’s 
obligations under the revised (and strengthened) MST of 1960 was to provide “facilities 
and areas” for use by American air, ground, and naval forces “[f]or the purpose of 
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Far East.”58
Although Tokyo’s initial, public reaction to Beijing’s announcement was 
“relatively muted,” Prime Minister Sato Eisaku wasted little time in testing the response 
of his American allies.  In late December 1964, the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin 
  It took but a small logical leap to see that if China were to 
retaliate against the United States, it could do so at close range by targeting U.S. forces in 
Japan. 
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Reischauer, reported to the State Department an encounter in which Prime Minister Sato 
suggested that Japan might develop its own nuclear weapon program in response to 
China’s test; Sato reportedly made a similar intimation directly to President Johnson.59  
During a summit meeting with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Sato again probed 
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and hinting that, failing a credible reassurance 
from Washington, Tokyo might seek its own nuclear deterrent.60
To think that Japan might “go nuclear” was not out of the question.  Japan had at 
least ten years of experience operating civilian nuclear power plants, constituting at least 
a latent nuclear potential ready to be tapped on short notice.
   
61  While Article 9 of the 
constitution restricted “war potential,” the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) issued an 
interpretation in 1957 that possession of nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional 
as long as the weapons were deployed in a defensive manner.62  In the interest of meeting 
its treaty obligations but, just as importantly, in support of its growing non-proliferation 
initiative, the Johnson Administration acceded to Sato’s request.  While the public Joint 
Statement at the end of the summit contained a vague reference to “the United States’ 
determination to abide by its commitments under the treaty to defend Japan against any 
attack,” in private conversations McNamara gave the kind of direct assurance that Sato 
had sought.63
A firm extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to cover attacks on Japan was a 
relief, but Sato still had to reconcile government policy with popular anti-nuclear 
sentiment.  Japan was the only nation ever to suffer from a nuclear attack; many of its 
citizens still remembered first-hand the devastation that had been wrought.  As a result, 
public opinion was (and has almost constantly been) highly negative of the possession of 
nuclear weapons, even if only for defensive purposes.
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objected to U.S. protection because of the (common) fear that the nuclear umbrella was 
but a ploy to further control non-nuclear-weapon states; even more moderate politicians 
had reservations over the potential to become entangled in a nuclear exchange.65
Sato took bold steps to overcome these obstacles.  The first came on December 
11, 1967, when Sato announced the now-famous “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”—that 
Japan would not possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, nor would it allow their 
“introduction” into the country without the prior permission of Japan.
  
66  Faced with 
concern that the principle of non-introduction might actually weaken the U.S. deterrent, 
Sato announced two months later the “Four Pillars Nuclear Policy.”  Here, Japan 
committed itself to the non-nuclear principles, the peaceful use of nuclear power, a push 
for global nuclear disarmament, and an explicit reliance on the U.S. extended deterrence 
against a nuclear attack on Japan.67  This marked the first time that any official, in Tokyo 
or Washington, had publically declared that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used to deter 
an attack against Japan.  This explicit guarantee made possible, in no small part, Tokyo’s 
participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Japan’s ratification of the 
NPT was not a quick or uncomplicated process; eighteen months of Diet debate took 
place before Japan signed the treaty in February 1970, and it was an additional six years 
before the treaty was ultimately ratified by the Diet.68
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It has been difficult to find contemporary documentation of Beijing’s response to 
these developments.69  Later statements encouraging Tokyo to maintain its non- 
proliferation stance suggest that Sato’s announcements would have ameliorated tensions 
between China and Japan by confirming that Tokyo would not seek a nuclear deterrent of 
its own.70  This is, however, but one component of the Four Pillars; what remains unclear 
is whether Beijing took Tokyo’s reliance on the nuclear umbrella as a positive sign, or if 
it was interpreted as only further evidence of hostility by the alliance toward China.  We 
do know, however, that Beijing decried the NPT for its discriminatory stance toward non-
nuclear weapons states, and for its enshrinement of superpower monopoly over nuclear 
technology; this is represents, in a sense, a point of unity in thinking between Beijing and 
Tokyo, as the Diet debate over the NPT also focused on the perception of creating a 
second class of states.71
E. BURGEONING SINO-JAPANESE TRADE 
 
Despite the lack of formal relations, Beijing and Tokyo nevertheless began 
developing significant trade relations soon after the Japanese surrender.  In 1950 small-
scale transactions for agricultural goods and small machinery accounted for $58 million 
in bilateral trade, although this trade quickly dropped off as a result of export restrictions 
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instituted by U.S. Forces Japan in the context of prosecuting the Korean War.72  When 
Japan regained its sovereignty, however, trade with the PRC boomed.  In June 1952, 
immediately after the San Francisco Treaty came into force, a group of Japanese 
businessmen travelled to Beijing to establish private, informal business missions.73  
Trade flourished, growing from a low of $15 million in 1952 to a high of $141 million in 
1957, with slightly more than half consisting of imports from China to Japan.74  From 
1952 to 1958, private businessmen—with the tacit backing of their governments—
concluded four trade agreements.  In 1955 the PRC government itself opened a trade 
mission in Japan.75
This tacit friendship came to an end, however, in 1958.  In May, a group of 
Japanese youths hauled down the PRC flag at a trade fair; this became known as the 
Nagasaki Flag Incident.  In the aftermath, China cut back trade with Japan, severely 
limiting exports to Tokyo and almost completely cutting off imports.
  The relationship between Beijing and Tokyo could thus be judged as 
that of tacit friends—no formal relations, but with informal approval of burgeoning trade. 
76  These restrictions 
lasted until 1960, when Premier Zhou Enlai permitted the resumption of trade only with 
companies that were willing to accept certain conditions, referred to as “friendly trade.”  
China again eased restrictions in 1962, permitting semi-official trade under fixed, five-
year agreements.  From 1962 to 1966 trade grew from $84 million to $621 million, 
marking a period that, except for China’s 1964 nuclear test, could be characterized as 
tacit friends.77
Interestingly, tension over China’s nuclear test is not reflected in a dip in trade (in 
contrast to the Japanese reaction to the Tiananmen Square protests, discussed in Chapter 
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V).  Trade did, however, fall off slightly after 1967, a reflection of both China’s 
increasingly isolationist foreign policy during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
as well as Japan’s increasingly pro-Taiwan, anti-PRC government under Prime Minister 
Sato.  In April 1970, China imposed further restrictions, implementing the “Four 
Principles of Trade,” essentially prohibiting Japanese firms conducting business in China 
from also conducting activities which support U.S. anti-communist policies in the region.  
Despite these restrictions, bilateral trade continued to flourish, growing from $822 
million in 1970 to $1,100 million in 1972.78
F. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
   Thus, even within the context of bilateral 
trade, the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing oscillated between cooperation and 
conflict. 
This chapter has traced the changes in the Sino-Japanese security relationship and 
the United States’ extended deterrent through the first decade and a half of the Cold War.  
At the very beginning of the nuclear era, China and Japan were in the midst of almost a 
decade of fighting; their relationship could only be characterized as hostile enemies.  
With the Japanese surrender and loss of sovereignty the relationship was altered to one of 
tacit enemies, lacking in formal recognition and hardly on good terms.  Various events 
from 1945 to 1969 reinforced this status.  The Treaty of San Francisco did not resolve the 
state of war between Japan and China, and the Treaty of Taipei was not binding on the 
government in Beijing.  Despite growing bilateral trade, relations between Beijing and 
Tokyo remained unofficial; economic interaction alone might argue for a relationship of 
tacit friends, but events such as China’s nuclear test and Japan’s explicit coverage under 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella continued to promote suspicion, if not a conflictual relationship 
best described as tacit enemies. 
During this period, U.S. nuclear doctrine evolved and deterrent strategy matured.  
As the Truman Administration’s reluctance to use nuclear weapons gave way to 
Eisenhower’s “New Look,” it became increasingly clear that the United States was 
willing (at least in principle) to use its nuclear arsenal to deter and defend against attacks
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on its friends and allies as well.  Over time this commitment was made more explicit, 
culminating in the late 1960s with private and public statements that the United States 
would use its nuclear weapons to provide a nuclear umbrella over Japan. 
The relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence and the Sino-Japanese 
relationship during this period is illustrated in Figure 2.  Throughout the early- to mid-
1950s Washington made ever-clearer statements of its willingness to use nuclear 
weapons in the event of an attack on Taiwan; combined with the presence of U.S. nuclear 
weapons in NATO countries, this constituted the very earliest conceptions of a nuclear 
umbrella for U.S. allies.  This umbrella was a significant, if not the primary, cause of 
China’s nuclear weapons program.  When Beijing became a nuclear power, this caused 
immediate concern in Tokyo, prompting the Sato administration to seek explicit coverage 
under U.S. extended deterrence.   
While it was the United States’ guaranteed nuclear coverage to Taiwan, not Japan, 
which influenced China’s decision to obtain nuclear weapons, taking a broad definition 
of the independent variable to include all U.S. allies shows that Washington’s guaranteed 
deterrent had a significant, deleterious impact on tensions in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship.  Conversely, it could be argued that once the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan 
was made explicit it had the effect of putting a damper on any Japanese nuclear ambitions 
and thus ameliorating tensions by preventing a Sino-Japanese nuclear arms race.  The 
magnitude of this positive influence, however, is moderate; the provision of the nuclear 
umbrella alone cannot be credited with preventing Japan from obtaining nuclear 
weapons.  Taken on the whole, then, the influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was 
somewhat muddled from 1945–1969; while the strongest influence was the amelioration 
of tensions by ending the war and preventing a nuclear Japan, Washington’s policies 
were nevertheless largely responsible for motivating the Chinese to obtain nuclear 
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III. THE LATE COLD WAR, 1969–1989 
The twenty years that comprised the late Cold War witnessed what is arguably the 
most dynamic period in the Sino-Japanese security relationship.  Beginning in a state of 
mutual ignorance, the relationship changed almost overnight to one of formal and 
friendly diplomatic relations.  Advances in technology improved the qualitative and 
quantitative capacity of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force, with some developments 
potentially redefining the nature of deterrence itself. 
This chapter will examine the evolution of the China-Japan relationship in the 
wake of Nixon’s opening and the Sino-Japanese and Sino-American normalization 
processes, as well as changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan incident to the Guam 
Doctrine, normalization, and technological advances such as the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI).  This chapter will demonstrate that, while the significant improvement in 
Sino-Japanese relations largely coincided with a strengthening of the United States’ 
nuclear deterrent, there is nevertheless little evidence to suggest a causal relationship. 
A. THE GUAM DOCTRINE 
When Richard Nixon became President of the United States in January 1969, he 
faced pressure to reduce U.S. military commitments overseas, especially in Asia where 
500,000 troops were fighting in Vietnam, in addition to the thousands of troops stationed 
in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.  At a press conference in Guam on July 25, Nixon 
announced a fundamental shift in the United States’ security policy.  While Washington 
would continue to meet its treaty obligations, “as far as the problems of military defense, 
except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons…the United States is 
going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly 
handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”79
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of “Vietnamization,” Nixon emphasized that the United States would continue to provide 
“a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us.”80
Despite the nuclear guarantee and emphasis on meeting treaty obligations, the so-
called Guam Doctrine nevertheless introduced a degree of uncertainty into Asia 
generally, and the U.S.-Japan alliance specifically.
 
81  At a previously-scheduled summit 
in late November, Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon exchanged views on the 
nature of relations between Washington and Tokyo.  The resulting Joint Statement, issued 
on November 21, detailed several important points of concurrence.  The first was that the 
Guam Doctrine would not undermine the United States’ commitments to Japan, 
extending even to troop levels.  The communiqué also outlined the process for reversion 
of Okinawa to Japanese control by 1972, with an understanding that the reversion would 
respect Tokyo’s policy on nuclear weapons (i.e., the principle of non-introduction).  The 
two leaders also declared their shared “hope that Communist China would adopt a more 
cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations.” Perhaps most significant, 
however, was the explicit declaration that “the maintenance of peace and security in the 
Taiwan area was also important for peace and security of Japan,” and thus of mutual 
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a mutual concern of the allies; this would likely have caused China to express concern 
about the interference of the United States and Japan in a domestic Chinese affair.  This 
absence of evidence is, admittedly, a shortcoming in assessing the influence of U.S. 
nuclear deterrence on the relationship between China and Japan. 
B. NIXON’S OPENING TO CHINA 
Over the course of the next three years, the Sato cabinet and the Nixon 
administration carried on a dialog relating not just to the Okinawa reversion, but on 
issues related to bilateral policy toward China.  Specifically, Washington wanted to 
coordinate with Tokyo on a plan for recognition of Beijing in the United Nations.  These 
discussions were so “intimate and frank” that, following a meeting on June 17, 1971, to 
formalize the Okinawa reversion, Sato was convinced that he and Nixon were lockstep on 
their mutual China policy.  One can imagine the prime minister’s surprise when, less than 
a month later, Nixon announced that his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had 
just returned from a secret meeting to Beijing, and that Nixon himself would travel to 
China the following year. 84
Nixon’s visit to China took place from February 21–28, 1971.  The resulting Joint 
Statement, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, dealt in large part with matters of 
bilateral relations.  Beijing took the opportunity to express its concern about “the revival 
and outward expansion of Japanese militarism” and its support for “the Japanese people's 
desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.”  For its part, the 
American delegation confirmed that it “place[d] the highest value on its friendly relations 
with Japan” and would continue to develop the existing “close bonds.”  Both sides agreed 
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that they should deal with each other without resorting to threat or use of force, while 
“agreeing to disagree” on the matter of Taiwan and the “one China” policy.85
1. Japanese Reactions to Nixon’s Opening 
 
The Guam Doctrine raised concerns among Japan’s leaders about the credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrence.  While the Nixon-Sato communiqué of 1969 spoke to the 
enduring mutual interest in the alliance and America’s unflagging commitment to its 
treaty obligations, the Sato cabinet nevertheless began studying the means and costs of 
weaning Japan from its dependence on the U.S. armed forces for its own defense.  Two 
studies were concluded in 1970, one convened by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 
director general (and later prime minister) Nakasone Yasuhiro, the other conducted by 
the Cabinet Office of Research at the behest of Sato himself.86  Both panels studied the 
feasibility of an independent, Japanese nuclear deterrent.  The two studies arrived at 
similar conclusions. Japan could easily overcome the technical difficulties involved in 
starting a nuclear weapons program; nevertheless, the consequences to Tokyo’s 
economic, domestic, and international standing outweighed any strategic benefit (and, 
indeed, could include costs to Japan’s strategic security as well).  The reports 
recommended continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as the best course of 
action, but nevertheless advocated maintaining the technological, scientific, and industrial 
capacity to quickly mount a nuclear weapons program should the strategic environment 
change drastically.87
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C. THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS 
1. Sino-Japanese Normalization 
Although Japan had decided to remain under the coverage of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, this did not completely allay its suspicions about the stability of the alliance.  
Indeed, Nixon’s overtures to China during 1971–1972 stoked further concern that a long-
held fear was coming to fruition.  Dating back to Yoshida’s signing of the San Francisco 
and Taipei treaties, Japanese leaders had harbored concerns that they would “wake up 
one morning to find that the United States had changed its policy toward Peking, leaving 
the Japanese out on a limb.”88
Although Prime Minister Sato disapproved of Nixon’s about-face on China, 
Tokyo soon mobilized its own program of rapprochement with Beijing.
  When Japan awoke on July 15, 1971, to find that it had, in 
fact, been left out to dry, it spurred Tokyo to seize the momentum (or fill the vacuum) 
and begin charting a more independent foreign policy from Washington’s. 
89  In July 1972, 
Sato retired and was replaced as prime minister by Tanaka Kakuei, who took a more 
forward-leaning approach than his predecessor.  On September 29, 1972, Tanaka 
travelled to Beijing—the first visit of a Japanese head of government to China.  The 
resulting Joint Statement announced that Tokyo and Beijing would establish normal 
diplomatic relations immediately.90
2. Sino-American Normalization 
  In the course of fourteen months, the strategic 
relationship between China and Japan had changed from one of mutual ignorance to that 
of friends. 
The rapid process of establishing normal relations between Tokyo and Beijing 
stands in stark contrast with the drawn-out process of normalization between Beijing and 
Washington.  For many reasons, relations between Washington and Beijing (and, for that 
matter, Taipei) languished in a state of ambiguity.  Beijing and Taipei both maintained a 
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“One China” policy: Taiwan was an integral part of China, with both Beijing and Taipei 
claiming to be the legal government of that single Chinese state.  Mao Zedong and his 
premier, Zhou Enlai, maintained that acknowledgement of the “One China” policy and 
renunciation of ties with Taipei was a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with 
Beijing.91  While Tanaka quickly conceded to this condition, Nixon was not prepared do 
so on his first trip to China.  He no doubt expected to normalize Sino-American relations 
after his reelection to a second term in November 1972.  The Watergate scandal, 
however, set Washington into a period of turmoil, and at the same time Beijing entered a 
period of leadership turmoil following the deaths of Zhou and Mao.92  As a result, Sino-
American normalization was postponed until 1978, when Chinese Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter released the “Joint Communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,” announcing that Beijing and Washington would 
formally recognized each other on January 1, 1979.93
D. THE IMMEDIATE POST-NORMALIZATION ERA, 1972–1979 
  
1. Arms Control and the Nuclear Umbrella 
Although Nixon’s opening to China is often viewed in the context of a worsening 
relationship with the Soviet Union, Washington and Moscow nevertheless made progress 
on the arms limitation process begun in the 1960s.  The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) resulted in two agreements.  The first, known also as the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABM), was signed by President Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in 
May 1972.  Although it did not reduce strategic arms per se, it did place significant 
constraints on the construction of ballistic missile defense systems.  By limiting the 
United States and the Soviet Union to two systems each—one to defend an ICBM site, 
the other to defend the national capital—the treaty in effect institutionalized the doctrine 
of mutually-assured destruction (MAD).94
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Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979, imposed a limit of 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles on 
each side.  Although the U.S. Congress never ratified the treaty (Carter having withdrawn 
it from consideration in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the Americans 
and Soviets nevertheless abided by its requirements until President Reagan formally 
broke the treaty in 1986.95
While the SALT treaties restricted BMD systems and number of delivery 
vehicles, they failed to address (from Washington’s perspective) the strategic superiority 
of Soviet ICBMs, raising questions about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and 
therefore the nuclear umbrella provided to its allies.  SALT II restricted the number of 
delivery vehicles, but not the number of warheads; a suitable answer to superior Soviet 
ICBMs would be the multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV).  In 1972 
the United States authorized a program to develop a MIRV’d ICBM for the Minuteman 
III.  Additionally, research was begun on the MX missile, intended to replace the aging, 
liquid-fueled Titan missile—thus maintaining the number of delivery vehicles while 
increasing the material capability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.  Development progressed 
rapidly, with the first of these new Peacekeeper missiles being deployed in 1979.
 
96
2. Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and Trade 
 
 With the establishment of normal relations between China and Japan in 1972 and 
Tokyo’s formal break with Taiwan, policymakers soon turned to the task of resolving the 
technical state of war that had remained despite the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco.  
Negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing began in 1974 but were suspended the next year 
due China’s insistence on an “anti-hegemony” clause which Japan felt would define the 
Sino-Japanese relationship as an anti-Soviet alliance.  Talks were suspended in May 1975 
and, owing to domestic political crises in both China and Japan, did not resume until 
1977.  Negotiations proceeded slowly until April 1978, when a small fleet of Chinese 
ships appeared in the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; Rose suggests that the Chinese 
“instigated” the incident as a “shock tactic” to bring about positive Japanese action on the 
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peace treaty.97  If true, it appeared to have worked; Prime Minister Fukuda soon dropped 
his objection to the anti-hegemony clause, and the treaty was signed in August of that 
year.98
Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, bilateral trade exploded.  
In 1972 total bilateral trade equaled $1.1 billion; the next year it had almost doubled, to 
$2 billion.  By the end of the decade trade had tripled; Tokyo and Beijing were trading 
$6.6 billion, representing a six-fold increase since normalization.
  The tensions of April 1978 casted a pall over the peace treaty negotiations; while 
the termination of the state of war was significant, it was also largely a formality.  As a 
result, the characterization of the relationship at this point in time (admittedly, quite 
subjectively) is that of feuding friends. 
99  In 1975, Japan 
became China’s largest trading partner, and Beijing sought increased economic assistance 
from Tokyo following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976.100  These heady economic 
times were not without setbacks, however.  Faced with increasing inflation in the context 
of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, in February 1979 China unilaterally cancelled 
several contracts with Japanese corporations, causing a mild rebuke from Tokyo, 
although trade volume was not affected.101
3. Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
  
In the late 1970s, Washington and Tokyo took steps to strengthen their nearly 
thirty year old partnership.  In 1976 the Japanese Cabinet issued its first-ever National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO), spelling out (rather ambiguously) the threats Japan 
faced and using that as justification for its force structure for FY1976 and after.  In 
releasing the NDPO, Prime Minister Miki committed Japan to an annual defense budget 
not to exceed 1% of GDP.  In 1978 the Cabinet released the Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines, another first; while notionally explaining how U.S. and Japanese 
forces would interoperate, the Guidelines remained focused only on contingencies in the 
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defense of Japan itself.  Although similar efforts in the 1950s and 1960s would have 
resulted in condemnation from Beijing, in the context of a Soviet build-up in the late 
1970s the development of the NDPO and the Cooperation Guidelines were actually 
viewed favorably by the Chinese government.102
E. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
 
1. Reagan’s Vision 
Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 on a platform of tough anti-Communist 
rhetoric.  In a speech on March 23, 1983, Reagan announced SDI.  Partly a response to 
the Soviet Union’s buildup of large numbers of ICBMs, the SDI program was intended to 
create a ground- and space-based capability to protect the United States from large-scale 
ballistic missile attacks.103 This was not America’s first attempt at a missile defense 
capability.  Interest in defense against ballistic missiles began almost as soon as the 
missiles themselves were introduced, dating back to early U.S. Army research in 
defensive systems against the German V-2 rocket.  In the mid-1950s the project was 
known as Nike-Zeus, intended to defend U.S. cities against a large-scale strategic attack 
by the Soviet Union.  In the face of technological hurdles, the project was scaled down 
and renamed Sentinel in 1967, now oriented to defending U.S. cities from “the kind of 
light, unsophisticated attack” that China’s nascent strategic force was expected to be 
capable of by the 1970s.  In 1969 the program was again renamed and scaled down, with 
Safeguard focusing on defending ICBM sites instead of cities.  In the context of the 1972 
ABM Treaty, Safeguard was again reduced in scope, with plans to defend the national 
command authority in Washington, DC, and one ICBM site in North Dakota.  
Technological and financial difficulties led to the project’s ultimate cancellation in 
1976.104
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SDI was unique among these programs for two reasons.  First was that, rather 
than relying on ground-based interceptors alone, SDI would also incorporate space-based 
systems, including lasers.  This technology was unproven; indeed, a good portion of it 
had not even been invented yet.  The costs of SDI were expected to be enormous.105  
This led to the second significant difference between SDI and its predecessors—inclusion 
of allies.  Partly to help defray costs, but also to allay fears about delinking of U.S. 
deterrence from alliance policies, Washington began courting its allies shortly after the 
President’s SDI announcement, especially the high-technology-savvy West Germany and 
Japan.  In exchange for sharing the burden of SDI, the allies would also reap the benefits 
of protection from a massive nuclear attack.106
The technical and financial challenges aside, SDI was not without controversy.  
Even short of actual development and deployment, the very concept SDI as something 
the United States might actually pursue had the potential to fundamentally alter the nature 
of nuclear deterrence.  If the United States could defend itself against incoming 
missiles—not just one or two, but the large-scale attack that the Soviet Union was 
expected to employ in a nuclear exchange, and the kind of attack against which the 
Reagan administration declared SDI was designed against—it would have the practical 
effect of undermining the credibility of the Soviet Union’s own nuclear deterrent.  
Proponents claimed that this would reduce the importance of, and create conditions for a 
world free of, nuclear weapons.  Critics, on the other hand—including leaders in many 
NATO capitals—foresaw a renewed arms race.  The United States could launch a 
disarming first attack on known Soviet missile bases, confident that SDI could counter 
any remaining second-strike capability.  As the argument went, SDI would have a 
deleterious effect on the relative stability between the superpowers; if Washington was 
going to research a strategic missile defense system, Moscow would have to respond by 
either developing its own missile defense system, or increasing the survivability of its 
nuclear arsenal by deploying more weapons at more hardened locations (or, possibly, 
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both).  Worse yet, the Soviet Union (or other nuclear-armed states) might resort to their 
own disarming first attack in the hopes of eliminating the U.S. nuclear arsenal before SDI 
could be deployed.107
Throughout 1985, the United States went to great pains in recruiting its allies to 
the SDI cause.  During a summit in January, Reagan reassured Japanese Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro that the system was “defensive in nature and [was] ultimately 
intended to make possible the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.”
 
108  At the 
G7 summit the following May, the U.S. delegation agreed to five points submitted by 
NATO and Japan regarding SDI; included were statements that “SDI should form an 
integral part of deterrence,” that SDI was not intended to achieve superiority over the 
Soviet Union, and that the Initiative should only move forward after “consultations with 
the allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union.”109  The following year, the United 
States and Japan agreed to a technical study on a Western Pacific Missile Architecture 
(WESTPAC), which took place from 1989 to 1993.110
2. China’s Response to SDI 
 
The announcement of SDI roughly coincided with, and in many ways spurred, the 
beginning of Chinese academic interest in deterrence theory.111  As a result, Beijing was 
somewhat slow to respond.  While some academics claimed that SDI was not only an 
“inevitable and appropriate response” to Moscow’s superior ICBM forces, others feared 
the impact on the credibility of China’s own deterrent.112
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from the PRC government came on August 2, 1985, almost eighteen months after 
Reagan’s announcement.  Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier and chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), decried SDI as a “qualitative escalation in the US-Soviet 
arms race.”113  Even if SDI did not upset the strategic balance between the superpowers, 
it would still have a significant impact on the credibility of China’s own nuclear 
deterrent.  At this point in time, China’s ICBM force amounted to approximately 10 Deng 
Feng (DF)-4 and DF-5 missiles, which could easily be defeated by a U.S. or Soviet BMD 
system.114 Motivated by this concern over the survivability of its limited nuclear arsenal, 
in 1984 Beijing began round-the-clock alerts of its Strategic Missile Forces.115  In 1985, 
China began a tactical nuclear weapons program in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s 
emphasis on “local, limited war.”116
The mid-1980s saw two very significant develops.  The first was a rapid increase 
in the number of warheads in China’s stockpile.  One analysis shows the gradual increase 
in the number of warheads from 1964 to 1980, with a rapid increase through 1985.
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The second was the beginning of China’s solid-fueled strategic weapons programs, the 
DF-31 (to replace the liquid-fueled DF-4 and DF-5), and a new SLBM, the Julang (JL)-2.  
Of course, these programs were not publically announced at the time, and in any event 
were not specifically linked as a response to SDI.  Glaser and Garrett note that most 
Chinese analysts were concerned about the threat to Beijing’s deterrent by the Soviet 
Union, as a result of a potential SDI arms race; additionally, Beijing’s concerns at the 
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significant role that both were to play in Reagan’s program.118
An additional development of note in China’s nuclear program was the first 
successful, submerged launch of the JL-1 SLBM from the Xia in 1988.
  Nevertheless, to the 
extent that Japan would later feel threatened by the Chinese strategic modernization 
program begun in the wake of SDI, we can consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella to have 
exerted a significant influence of exacerbating tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. 
119  Although the 
deployment of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) notionally enhances the credibility of 
one’s deterrent by providing a survivable, second-strike capability, the significance of 
this development is circumscribed by the fact that it has rarely put to sea since then; an 
SSBN is not survivable if it is in port.120  Additionally, the successful deployment of the 
JL-1 was likely more coincidentally timed in the context of SDI than intentionally 
planned; Project 09, the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) SSBN program, was first authorized in 
1958, decades before the advent of SDI.121
F. THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1980S 
  As a result, the SSBN-SLBM program is best 
viewed as a long-term result of China’s initial nuclear program, and not a response to 
SDI. 
On non-military fronts, the 1980s was a period of oscillation between tension and 
cooperation.  Trade relations were especially fraught.  By 1981 bilateral trade accounted 
for $10.4 billon, a ten-fold increase since 1971.122  This tapered off from 1982 to 1983, 
first as a result of Beijing’s suspending contracts for various construction projects funded 
by capital from Japanese businesses, then as China imposed restrictions on Japanese 
imports.  After recovering from this dip, trade continued to grow from 1984 until 1989, 
reaching $19.6 billion—almost doubling from the beginning of the decade.123
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Diplomatic interactions alternated between a series of “firsts” and reflections on 
the past.  In the summer of 1982 a controversy erupted over a proposed Japanese high 
school textbook which appeared to gloss over the atrocities of the Japanese army during 
the Pacific War; a similar crisis arose in 1984.  August 1985 saw Prime Minister 
Nakasone make a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japanese war dead where 
many Class A war criminals were enshrined in the 1970s.124  These low points were 
punctuated by highs.  In 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang travelled to Tokyo to 
celebrate the tenth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations.125  In April 1984 
senior PLA officials made a first-ever visit to Tokyo, followed by a reciprocal visit of 
SDF leaders to Beijing the following June.  May 1985 saw the deputy director-general of 
the JDA visit China, and the chief of the Chinese general staff visited Japan the same 
month.  Two years later, the JDA director-general made his own visit to China.126
G. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
  When 
these changes in the Sino-Japanese relationship are compared against changes in the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent—and especially Japan’s involvement in SDI—there appears to be little 
correlation.  For example, the 1985 decision to participate in SDI occurred in the context 
of both increasing trade and increasing military-to-military exchanges.  As a result, the 
oscillation between cooperative and conflictual relations as measured by trade and 
diplomatic interactions cannot be attributed to changes in the nuclear umbrella. 
1. The Tiananmen Square Protests 
Following the death of the moderate Chinese reformer, Hu Yaobang, in April 
1989, pro-democracy protests began to spread throughout Beijing.  By May, students, 
intellectuals, and other protesters had occupied Tiananmen Square, urging the 
government to continue the moderate policies of Hu.  Concerned for the stability of the 
government and the party’s hold on power, Deng Xiaoping declared martial law in 
Beijing and the PLA was ordered to clear the square.  Shortly after midnight on June 4, 
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tanks and armored personnel carriers began moving into Beijing, often violently dealing 
with protesters along the way.  By the end of the day, Tiananmen Square had been 
cleared, and thousands of civilians had been injured or killed.127
 The Tiananmen crackdown represented a sharp turning point in China’s foreign 
relations.  Almost immediately every Western nation, as well as Japan, announced severe 
economic and political sanctions against Beijing.  The United States and European Union 
imposed tight trade restrictions, including cutting off all sales of military technology, and 
curtailed military-to-military cooperation.
 
128  Japan also terminated military exchanges, 
as well as suspending ¥810 billion in loans.129
2. Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe 
  For the Sino-Japanese relationship, June 
4, 1989 marks a very distinct change, from cooperative friends to feuding friends. 
In the broader context of international events, June 1989 in many ways 
represented the beginning of the end Cold War.  Partially a result of Soviet Premier 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika reforms, a wave of largely-peaceful 
revolutions swept through the Warsaw Pact throughout the summer and fall of 1989.  
Beginning in Poland, by the end of the year Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and East Germany had overthrown their Communist governments and begun 
the process of democratization.  By November the Berlin Wall had fallen, and a joint 
U.S.-Soviet statement from a shipboard summit off Malta announced that the “epoch of 
cold war” had ended.130
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H. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter has traced the course of the China-Japan security relationship 
through a period of immense change.  Beginning in 1969, Beijing and Tokyo were in the 
post-World War II state of formal, mutual ignorance, with increasing levels of informal 
interaction on trade issues being best characterized as a relationship of tacit friends.  The 
strategic relationship changed in September 1972 when, spurred by the shock of Nixon’s 
opening to China, Japan switched its diplomatic recognition of “China” from Taipei to 
Beijing, and thus making the friendship one of cooperative friends.  The relationship 
remained amicable throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but the PRC’s crackdown in 
Tiananmen Square and the resulting Japanese sanctions left the relationship in terms of 
feuding friends from June 1989.  Although China and Japan both witnessed qualitative 
and quantitative improvements in their military capabilities, there is no evidence that 
these changes were part of a negative security spiral. 
Washington’s extended deterrent saw great change throughout this period as well.  
Despite reassurances from the White House, the Guam Doctrine and the opening to China 
left many in Tokyo concerned about the credibility of the United States’ guarantees to 
defend Japan.  The evolving arms control process suggested Washington was becoming 
less willing to develop new nuclear weapons to undergird its deterrent; at the same time, 
these agreements did not lead China to cease or slow its own nuclear program.  The 1983 
introduction of SDI threatened to alter the face of nuclear deterrence, although by inviting 
its allies to participate in the necessary research and development, Washington 
demonstrated its intention that SDI would be incorporated into the nuclear umbrella it 
provided over Europe and Japan.  The 1980s also saw qualitative advances in the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal itself, including design of the new Peacekeeper ICBM and deployment of 
the Trident SLBM, both incorporating MIRV’d warheads. 
These significant changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, however, appear largely 
uncorrelated to changes in the China-Japan security relationship.  Although actions by 
Washington directly influenced the beginning of Sino-Japanese rapprochement and 
normalization—that is, Nixon’s opening to China in 1971–72—that influence was not a 
function of changes in America’s nuclear posture under any of the definitions adopted in 
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this thesis.  When significant changes did occur in the U.S. deterrent, as with the 
introduction of SDI, the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reflects little significant 
change at that time.  It can safely be said that between 1969 and 1989 the U.S. nuclear 
guarantee to Japan had little, if any, immediate influence on tensions in the China-Japan 
security relationship, as illustrated in Figure 3.  As will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter, however, the introduction of SDI would have a negative impact on Sino-
Japanese relations in the late 1990s and 2000s.  This serves as a poignant reminder that 
the temporal periodization adopted here should not be taken for anything more than a 
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Figure 3.   U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1969–1989 
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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1989–2001 
The approximate decade from the end of the Cold War in December 1989 to the 
summer of 2001 saw a massive reordering of the global balance of power.  As the threat 
of strategic nuclear attack subsided, the U.S. nuclear arsenal underwent significant 
qualitative and quantitative changes.  The relationship between China and Japan 
continued to evolve as well, as both nations sought to establish a framework for 
interaction in the post-Cold War era. 
In this chapter, the changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are traced from the 
immediate post-Cold War reduction in nuclear force readiness to the evolution of missile 
defenses in the face of threats from regional nuclear proliferators such as Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea.  Analysis of the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reveals that, while 
missile defense cooperation with the United States is a source of ire for Beijing, most 
changes in the quality of the relationship are a function of considerations outside the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella. 
A. TRANSITION FROM THE COLD WAR AND U.S. NUCLEAR 
DETERRENCE 
1. Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The seven months from June to December 1989 witnessed the end of 
Communism in Eastern Europe; this precipitated a weakening of the Soviet Union.  
Combined with Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika of the late 1980s, the early 1990 
decision to legalize political parties other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) sparked a rapid process of opening, democratization, and ultimately declarations 
of independence by various Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs).  The result was a rapid 
decentralization and further reform, culminating in the independence of all the constituent 
SSRs and the transfer of power from Soviet institutions to Russian ones.  By December 
31, 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist.  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union marked a change in the international system whose significance is difficult 
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to overstate.  In the course of two and a half years, the bipolar balance that had dominated 
international relations for almost half a century had given way to a unipolar world with 
the United States as the sole superpower.131
2. Immediate Impact on U.S. Nuclear Deterrence 
 
As a result of the rapid decline in Washington-Moscow tensions and the United 
States’ emergence as the world’s sole superpower, American security policies would 
soon came under review.  During his State of the Union speech in January 1991, 
President George H.W. Bush announced a retooling of SDI; rather than defending against 
large-scale attacks from an enemy who no longer existed, the missile defense program 
would focus on limited, regional nuclear attacks.132  In May, the United States removed 
many targets in Eastern Europe from the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP).  On 
July 31, Bush and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I), committing Washington and Moscow to reduce their 
arsenals to 6,000 operational warheads, or approximately 40% of 1989 deployment 
levels.  Two months later, Bush announced several unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear 
postures, including the removal of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) from Europe and 
from U.S. Navy warships world-wide, the end of day-alert status for the U.S. Air Force’s 
nuclear bomber force, the cessation of deterrent patrols by SSBNs armed with the older 
Poseidon SLBM, and the cancellation of various nuclear force modernization plans.133  
The United States and Russia further agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals in January 
1993, with the signing of the START II agreement.  This treaty provided a limit of 3,000 
operational warheads by 2004, as well as for the de-MIRVing of all land-based ICBMs, 
which spelled the end of the Peacekeeper ICBM.134
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In 1994, the Clinton Administration carried out the United States’ first Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR).  The NPR determined that, in light of the changed strategic 
environment and the pending implementation of START II, additional reductions in the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal were in order.  The NPR recommended reducing the number of 
SSBNs and nuclear-capable bombers, and as well as reducing the number of Minuteman 
III missiles that would be retained.  In order to reassure allies—namely, NATO—about 
U.S. commitment to its nuclear guarantees, significant numbers of TNWs would remain 
in the European theater, although all such weapons had already been removed from 
forward deployment in Asia.135  Despite these reductions, however, the 1994 NPR also 
indicated that the United States would not seek further reductions and would maintain the 
ability to increase its arsenal again in order to “hedg[e] against an uncertain future.”136  
Although the actual NPR remains classified, the unclassified press release is notable 
because it frames the entire discussion of U.S. strategic posture in terms of the former 
Soviet Union and the bilateral arms control treaties, START I and II.  Brief mention is 
made to the threat of “weapons of mass destruction in a regional conflict,” but no specific  
mention is made of China or Japan.137  It is worth noting, however, that discussion 
incident to the leak of classified portions of the 2001 NPR also mentioned that nuclear 
war with China was a contingency considered for war planning in the 1994 review.138
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3. Scaling Down “Star Wars” 
While the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union obviated the need 
for SDI as protection against a massive nuclear attack, the rise of regional nuclear 
proliferators highlighted the need to protect U.S. and allied forces from small-scale, 
theater missile attacks.  This was partially underscored by the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, 
where a coalition led by the United States not only forced Iraq out of Kuwait, but also 
entered Iraq in an effort to find and dismantle Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons 
programs.139
As discussed earlier, President Bush announced a scaled-down SDI in 1991, 
focusing on regional threats as opposed to a massive Soviet nuclear attack.  The concept 
of this limited missile defense was explicitly extended to U.S. allies and, in overtures 
beginning in 1992, to non-enemies such as Russia.
 
140  The idea was to build a “global 
protection system from limited attacks” (GPALS) by “renegade countries;” including 
Russia in this program would reassure Moscow that they were no longer the target of 
U.S. missile defense.  China, however, was not extended an invitation to participate in 
GPALS discussions, suggesting that the United States viewed China as a threat.141
President Clinton continued the missile defense program when he entered office 
in 1993.  The former SDI Organization (SDIO) was renamed the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO), with an explicit focus on theater missile defense (TMD), 
designed to defend U.S. and allied forces against a limited attack by a regional threat, 
such as Iraq or North Korea.
 
142
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  Following North Korea’s May 1993 test of a Nodong-1 
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and threat to withdraw from the NPT, 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin approached JDA Director General Keisuke Nakanishi 
about Japanese participation in a TMD system; the result was the September 1993 
establishment of a TMD working group to study a way ahead for U.S.-Japanese 
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cooperation.143  In June 1994, four proposals were put forth, and in August the Prime 
Minister’s Advisory Group recommended that Japan cooperate on a TMD system to 
counter a “limited missile attack.”144  From 1995 to 1998, the Japanese defense budget 
included a total of ¥560 million for studies, but Tokyo “remained reticent about 
committing itself to actual participation in co-operative research” with the United 
States.145  Although Japanese leaders maintained that TMD cooperation was in response 
to the North Korean missile threat, Chinese leaders were suspicious at continued interest 
despite the October 1994 Agreed Framework which appeared to eliminate Pyongyang’s 
nuclear ambitions.146
B. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS TO 1996 
 
1. Recovery from Tiananmen 
Following the PLA’s crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square, China’s 
relations with the world entered a period of marked coolness and even isolation.  Western 
nations suspended military-to-military contacts and trade in defense-related materials and 
technology; for its part, Japan suspended the third in a series of significant yen loans to 
Beijing out of protest for the harsh treatment of its citizens during the June 4, 1989, 
incident.  Although Tokyo and Beijing maintained formal relations during this time, the 
short-term character of the relationship was that of feuding friends. 
While many of the post-Tiananmen restrictions imposed by Europe and the 
United States continue to the present day, Japan’s ostracization of China came to a 
comparatively quick end.  Barely six months afterward, Japanese Prime Minster Kaifu 
became the first post-Tiananmen visitor to Beijing, where he announced a loan to build a 
hospital in Shanghai.147
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sanctions and resumed full trade with Beijing, including reinstatement of the ¥810 billion 
loan that had been suspended in the wake of the Tiananmen protests.148 In October 1992 
Emperor Akihito travelled to Beijing, becoming the first Japanese head of state to visit 
the Middle Kingdom.149
This improvement was short-lived, however.  In 1993, facing the beginning of 
what would become known as the “Lost Decade” of economic stagnation, Tokyo grew 
increasingly concerned about Beijing’s growing strength in the bilateral relationship.  
Japan redefined the rules for its Overseas Direct Assistance (ODA) funding, inserting an 
“insistence on restraint in military spending.”
  The Sino-Japanese relationship was thus restored to cooperative 
friends.   
150  In response, China began raising the 
issue of Japan’s history of aggression and, to some, failure to adequately apologize; this 
was complicated throughout the spring and summer of 1994, as some Japanese cabinet 
officials inexplicably denied well-documented events such as the Nanjing massacre.151
2. China’s Continuing Nuclear Tests 
 
Tensions further deepened in 1995, as Japanese Prime Minister Murayama 
Tomiichi (who would later become the first prime minister to officially apologize for 
Japanese actions during World War II) travelled to Beijing in early May 1995 for a 
summit with Chinese Premier Li Peng.  During the visit, Murayama asked Li to self-
impose a moratorium on nuclear testing.  This seemed a reasonable request to Murayama, 
as Japan was the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack; Chinese leaders, on the other 
hand, resented being criticized by “the country that had wreaked havoc on their land and 
never satisfactorily apologized.”152
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conducting its forty-second nuclear test.  As a result, Tokyo immediately suspended 
approximately $86 million in ODA, although this was largely symbolic in the context of 
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a $1.6 billion package for FY1996.153  To Beijing, however, this ODA was viewed as a 
sort of informal war reparation, and as a result attempted to deny Japan the right to 
suspend the funding.154
3. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
   
Matters got worse in July with the onset of the third Taiwan Strait Crisis.  From 
July 1995 through March 1996, Beijing conducted various military exercises and missile 
tests in the international waters surrounding Taiwan; an additional nuclear test at Lop Nur 
in August.155  Although these actions are widely understood as intended to intimidate 
Taipei and its increasingly pro-democratic government, the crisis nevertheless raised 
concerns for Tokyo as well.  First, as an island nation, Japan is heavily dependent on 
imports, much of which travels by sea over the shipping lanes adjacent to Taiwan; a 
conflict off the coast of Taiwan could jeopardize the safety of those shipping lanes.156  
More alarming, however, was the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers—including the 
Japan-based USS Independence—to the region.  The MST committed Tokyo and 
Washington to consult on issues of “international peace and security in the Far East,” but 
did not require that Japan physically aid in the enforcement or creation of such security.  
Nevertheless, the potential for direct United States involvement in a cross-strait crisis 
raised the prospect that Japan might be drawn into a war between Beijing and Taipei as a 
result of its alliance with Washington.157  Despite the tension in the alliance, and an 
August 1995 confrontation between Japanese and Chinese fighters over Senkaku/Diaoyu 
airspace, Japan’s response was muted.  The government publically condemned Beijing’s 
threat of force to intimidate the island, but did not take any tangible action such as 
suspending any economic or political interactions.158
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C. REAFFIRMING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
By 1995, the alliance between Washington and Tokyo was in a state that many 
analysts called “drift,” lacking a clear direction.  Japanese inaction during the Gulf War 
left many in the United States wondering about the purpose of an alliance where the 
benefits appeared to accrue to one partner at the expense of the other.159  As evidence of 
Japanese concerns over the credibility of U.S. deterrent guarantees in the context of a 
shrinking nuclear arsenal and increasing reliance on missile defense, as well as growing 
concern over North Korea’s nuclear program, the JDA initiated a study on the “Problems 
of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”160  Despite the somewhat 
misleading title, the report actually investigated the feasibility of an independent Japanese 
nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War era.  Like the reports of 1968–70 (another period 
of malaise in the U.S.-Japan alliance), the 1995 study concluded that, while technically 
feasible, Japan’s national interest was best served by not obtaining its own nuclear 
weapons, and maintaining reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.161
1. The Reaffirmation Process 
 
A series of bilateral and international events—the rape of an Okinawan girl by a 
U.S. Marine, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the North Korean nuclear crisis— 
convinced alliance managers in Washington and Tokyo that a “reaffirmation” was 
necessary.162
The February 1995 EASR (also known as the Nye Initiative) emphasized the U.S. 
commitment to an enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific, specifically concerns about 
  The plan that was conceived involved four distinct steps: the U.S. East 
Asia Strategy Review (EASR), a revised Japanese NDPO, revised guidelines for 
cooperation, and a joint security declaration. 
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reducing conventional forces to a level which made friends and allies uneasy.163  In 
December 1995 the Cabinet unveiled the National Defense Program Outline for fiscal 
year 1996 and after.  It emphasized Japan’s intention to closely coordinate with the 
United States on security matters, and to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent while making 
efforts toward the abolition of all nuclear weapons.164  The April 1996 Joint Security 
Declaration between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro 
emphasized that the alliance “remain[ed] the cornerstone for achieving common security 
objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific 
region;” it also confirmed that “U.S. deterrence…remains the guarantee for Japan’s 
security” and emphasized the importance of BMD cooperation.165
The reaffirmation process culminated in the September 1997 release of revised 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines.  The revised Guidelines significantly 
expanded the role of the SDF in responding to contingencies, especially those in “areas 
surrounding Japan.”  The Guidelines also provided for greatly increased coordination 
between the United States and Japan in defense planning and intelligence sharing.
 
166
2. China’s Reaction to the Reaffirmation Process 
 
China’s reaction to the alliance reaffirmation process was notably hostile.  The 
increased role accorded to Japan in the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines was 
perceived as a means of containing China in much the same way as the Tokyo-
Washington alliance contained the USSR during the Cold War.  Although the Guidelines 
referred only to cooperation during contingencies in the “areas surrounding Japan,” 
Washington and Tokyo went to great lengths to emphasize that this was a “situational” 
and not a geographic definition.167
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alliance was posturing for greater intervention in a future Taiwan contingency.  This 
suspicion was fueled by Japanese missteps; for example, on August 17 the Japanese 
Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that Taiwan was in fact included in the “areas surrounding 
Japan.”168  The next month, during a visit to Beijing, Prime Minister Hashimoto faced 
“strong opposition” from President Jiang Zemin over both the Guidelines and Tokyo’s 
increasing cooperation with the United States on TMD.169
China’s hostile reaction to the alliance reaffirmation must also be viewed in the 
context of strictly bilateral issues; in this sense, the mid-1990s were turbulent.  In July 
1996—mere months after the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security Declaration which 
sparked Chinese suspicions—a group of private Japanese citizens erected a lighthouse in 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Tokyo then refused to dismantle.  Later that month, 
Prime Minister Hashimoto made a visit to the divisive Yasukuni Shrine, sparking public 
protests in Beijing and other Chinese cities.
   
170
D. EXPANSION OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
   
1. Greater Japanese Participation 
The year 1998 provided the first test of the newly-reaffirmed alliance.  On August 
31, North Korea conducted a test of its Taepodong-1 ICBM; the path of the missile took 
it through Japanese air space.  As a result, Secretary of Defense William Perry reoriented 
the BMDO toward pursuit of both TMD and a larger-scale national missile defense 
(NMD) program.  In addition, the United States again approached Japan regarding 
participation in TMD development.  Motivated by the increasingly-imminent threat of 
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announced that they would jointly conduct technical research into a missile defense 
system, a decision which was formally approved by the Japanese National Security 
Council on December 25.171
Japan’s cooperation materialized in the form of ¥978 million for research into 
four key components of the TMD interceptor: an infrared seeker, a heat shield for the 
seeker, a kinetic warhead, and the second-stage rocket motor.  Of the four proposed U.S. 
systems (ground- and sea-based systems, each with a high- and low-end configuration), 
Japan’s participation was targeted at the low-end, sea-based system.  This was a result of 




While the NMD and TMD research progressed apace under the Clinton 
Administration, the program received greater attention in early 2001 under President 
George W. Bush.  In a speech on May 1, Bush placed BMD in the context of not only the 
nuclear threats posed by countries such as North Korea and Iraq, but also the need to de-
emphasize nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world in an attempt to stem the trend 
toward proliferation.  He tasked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with identifying 
options for rapid deployment of a limited missile defense, as well as continuing existing 
research and development on a more robust system.  Further, he declared the dispatch of 
envoys to allies across the globe, and emphasized the “need to reach out to other 
interested states, including China and Russia.”
 
173
2. Chinese Reactions to Missile Defense 
  While this statement arguably 
indicates that missile defense was not directed against Beijing, it did not extend the same 
invitation for joint development that was made to Moscow. 
Beijing’s response to missile defense was consistently negative; after every major 
U.S. announcement, China quickly followed with a denouncement about the destabilizing 
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effect that missile defense would have, especially on countries with small nuclear 
arsenals, and general threats about the necessity of either increasing the size of its nuclear 
arsenal or developing its own missile defense system as a means of ensuring the 
credibility of its deterrent.174
During this time, China sent mixed signals regarding its strategic deterrent.  In 
July 1996, shortly after the release of the Joint Security Declaration, China conducted a 
final nuclear test before announcing its preparedness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) then under negotiation.  Washington and Beijing both signed the CTBT 
on September 24, although its ratification has been stalled in both countries.
 
175  In 1998, 
Beijing published its first-ever defense white paper, which publically reemphasized its 
commitment to its NFU policy.176  Nevertheless, Chinese leaders continued to emphasize 
the importance of nuclear deterrence to Chinese strategy, and took steps to demonstrate 
that importance.  In 1997, PRC President Jiang Zemin announced a fifty-year national 
defense modernization program, including significant upgrades to China’s deterrent 
capability.  In August 1999, China conducted the first successful test of its newest ICBM, 
the solid-fueled DF-31, and the Central Committee of the CCP reportedly authorized a 
program to develop countermeasures and other means of defeating a missile defense 
system.177
As U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense deepened following the 1998 North 
Korean missile test, China’s anti-missile defense rhetoric increased as well.  In an April 
1999 speech to U.S. and Chinese academics and policymakers, the Chinese ambassador 
to the Conference on Disarmament decried missile defense as inimical to U.S. interests in 
nuclear non-proliferation and ultimate disarmament; he also argued that U.S.-Japan 
cooperation on BMD would be destabilizing more broadly for the Asia-Pacific region, 
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and could serve as “a stepping stone for Japan's return to the track of militarism.”178  A 
joint statement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin in July 2000 denounced the plans of a “certain country” to implement a missile 
defense system in the Asia-Pacific region, and called on the international community to 
“pay serious attention” to international stability in the face of this development—
although neither Putin nor Jiang called out Japan for its cooperation on missile 
defense.179  In reaction to Bush’s 2001 speech on BMD, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement warning of the destabilizing effects of the “destruction” of the ABM 
Treaty; again, however, Japan was not called out for its cooperation with the United 
States.180
E. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 
 
Looking more broadly than defense issues, the Sino-Japanese relationship 
appeared on a general downward trend from 1998 to 2001.  In November 1998, the 
month after the U.S.-Japan announcement on joint BMD research, Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin travelled to Tokyo for a summit meeting.  While the BMD announcement 
cast a small pall over the visit, the summit was truly overshadowed by a summit just prior 
in Korea.  There, Prime Minister Obuchi issued a formal apology for Japanese actions on 
the Korean peninsula since 1910.  When it became obvious that no such apology was 
forthcoming during the Jiang-Obuchi summit, the Chinese leader was incensed; he 
proceeded to spend the remainder of the summit angrily discussing the issue of Sino-
Japanese history.181
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endorsed China’s bid for accession to the World Trade Organization.182  By early 2001, 
however, a new, right-wing leader had come to power in Japan.  The first months of 
Koizumi Junichiro’s administration saw renewed protests over a proposed junior high 
school textbook revision, a trade dispute over agricultural imports to Japan, and Beijing’s 
imposition of retaliatory tariffs on automobiles and other consumer goods.183  Tensions 
reached a low in August when, despite pleas from both Beijing and Seoul, Koizumi 
followed through on a campaign promise to visit Yasukuni Shrine.184
F. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
  
The period from late 1989 to mid-2001 saw significant change in the quantitative 
and qualitative credibility of Washington’s nuclear deterrent.  As the Soviet Union 
collapsed and the existential threat to the United States ceased, successive presidents 
reduced the size of America’s nuclear arsenal and cancelled modernization programs in 
favor of life extension programs for existing nuclear weapons.  As the threat of attack 
from regional proliferators increased, however, the United States saw utility in a missile 
defense system and enlisted the help of its allies—including Japan—in its development.  
This program only took on additional urgency in the wake of North Korea’s 1998 ICBM 
test. 
On the strategic level, the China-Japan relationship remained squarely one of 
long-term friends, with no breaks in diplomatic relations during this time.  While tensions 
between Tokyo and Beijing receded quickly after the repeal of Japan’s post-Tiananmen 
sanctions, bilateral relations nevertheless suffered as a result of Chinese actions before 
and during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, culminating in the suspension of 
significant Japanese aid to the Chinese economy, although this was short-lived, with aid 
being reinstated following China’s signing of the CTBT.  Although Tokyo was the 
subject of some angry Chinese rhetoric over its participation in U.S. missile defense 
research, tensions between Beijing and Tokyo were mainly related to domestic politics 
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and trade issues, not Japanese participation in missile defense.  The China-Japan security 
relationship thus oscillated back and forth from feuding friends to cooperative friends. 
Short of rhetoric, however, Tokyo’s participation in TMD does not appear to have 
been the impetus for changes in the Sino-Japanese relationship.  Trade continued to grow 
during this time.  The Chinese observation that TMD could impair Beijing’s ability to 
attack targets in Japan raised some eyebrows in Tokyo—China had never (and still, 
technically, has not) admitted to aiming missiles at Japan, and its self-avowed NFU 
policy would suggest that non-nuclear-armed Japan should be exempt from nuclear 
threat—but did not lead to any sanctions, cancelled visits, or other clear indications of 
cooling relations.185  While the risk of missile defense serving as a “stepping stone” to 
Japanese remilitarization is an issue, China’s main point of contention over U.S. missile 
defense—and Japanese participation in joint development, especially the sea-based, 
mobile variant—appears to revolve around its implicit extension to Taiwan.  Coverage of 
Taiwan by U.S. missile defenses would not only constitute foreign intervention in a 
domestic dispute (in Beijing’s mind) but would also severely undercut the deterrent (or 
coercive) effect of the thousands of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) pointed across 
the Taiwan Strait.186
To the extent that the Sino-Japanese relationship can be solely measured in terms 
of military hardware, China’s nuclear modernization program in the context of Japanese 
participation in TMD might imply a security spiral.  The lead-time on such an extensive 
program as the DF-31 makes a causal relationship difficult to gauge; because the DF-31 
program was begun in the mid-1980s it can more reasonably be judged a response to SDI, 
not TMD and NMD.  Perhaps the program was accelerated and timed to coincide with a 
response to the 1998 advancement of Japanese participation in TMD.  There is little 
evidence, however, to indicate that the pace of modernization increased during this 
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period; the time from initial development to first test for the DF-31 is comparable to that 
for all of China’s previous DF-series missiles.187
As illustrated in Figure 4, the linkage between changes in the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella and the Sino-Japanese relationship is most clearly evident in the late 1990s, first 
as a result of China’s response to SDI, then later as Beijing began new programs in 
response to more recent missile defense initiatives.  Some of this is tentative; will China’s 
BMD countermeasures be successful?  How long will that take?  In any event, the 
influence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee is clearly toward exacerbation; the magnitude, 
however, is varied.  To the extent that SDI motivated China’s strategic modernization, the 
influence would be significant; as noted in the previous chapter, Chinese analysts saw 
SDI as upsetting the delicate balance between Washington and Moscow.  On the matter 
of late 1990s initiatives, the influence is best judged as weak to moderate.  The lack of 
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Figure 4.   U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1989–2001 
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BMD countermeasures and other programs were initiated, and thus complicates a 
determination of whether they were simply a continuation of the reaction to SDI or 
represented a new response.   
 66 
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V. THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA, 2001–PRESENT  
The events of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in U.S. security strategy.  
Giving impetus to a new look at Washington’s nuclear posture, the Bush Administration 
set out to add new, tactical nuclear capabilities to its arsenal, as well as expansion of its 
nascent missile defense program.  The relationship between Tokyo and Beijing also 
underwent significant change, often alternating between cooperative friends and feuding 
friends.  As this chapter will demonstrate, however, those changes in the short-term 
relationship are largely uncorrelated with changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan. 
A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of nineteen Al-Qaeda terrorists 
hijacked four commercial airliners; two crashed into New York’s Twin Towers and one 
into the Pentagon, with the fourth crashing in a field in rural Pennsylvania.  By the end of 
the day, almost 3,000 people were dead, and the United States was orienting itself toward 
a war on terrorism.  In the words of David Lampton and Richard Ewing, the events of 
September 11, 2001, “brought about profound changes to the threat perceptions of 
Americans and, consequently, to America’s national security strategy.”188  Significantly, 
the war on terrorism presented an opportunity for increased cooperation between 
Washington and Tokyo, as well as Washington and Beijing.  For Japan, U.S. operations 
in Afghanistan presented the opportunity to redeem its lack of support in 1991; Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichiro quickly pledged his government’s support, and soon Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) oilers were deployed to the Indian Ocean to 
refuel coalition warships operating in support of the war on terror.189  China was also 
quick to lend its support to the United States; in addition to pledging $150 million for the 
reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan, Beijing also used the specter of Al-Qaeda 
and Islamist extremism to crack down on the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province.190
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While the September 11 attacks prompted improved bilateral relations between 
Washington and its Asian partners, it also presented an opportunity to underscore the 
Bush Administration’s position on missile defense.  The 9/11 attacks were planned and 
executed by a group based out of Afghanistan.  If such a low-tech yet highly devastating 
operation could be orchestrated from a rogue nation with no nuclear ambitions, imagine 
the risk posed by such nations that were pursuing nuclear weapons.  Shortly after 
September 11, the U.S. government indicated that there might be a relationship between 
Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq.  
Although such a relationship was ultimately disproved, the threat of nuclear terrorism 
sponsored by rogue nations nevertheless served to support the Bush administration’s 
argument in favor of a robust missile defense system.191
1. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
 
In January 2002 the administration released its 2001 NPR.  Abandoning the 
“legacy” strategic triad of SSBNs, bombers, and ICBMs, the 2001 NPR established a new 
triad consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear strike capability, active and passive defenses, 
and a robust research and development capacity and industrial infrastructure to “develop, 
build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.”  The term “active 
defenses” was understood to refer to BMD.192
A key component of the 2001 NPR was the assessment that a strategic nuclear 
attack by Russia was unlikely (although a leaked version of the still-classified report 
indicates that a nuclear war with China was considered a planning priority in the context 
of a Taiwan crisis), and that America’s nuclear arsenal needed to be re-tooled in order to 
respond to smaller threats from rogue nations and non-state actors, and to execute 
precision strikes against hardened targets.
   
193
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nuclear weapon could be employed against targets where even precision conventional 
munitions would be unsuccessful.  In this context, the administration sought funding for 
research and development on both a robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) for targeting 
hardened sites such as command and control or weapons research bunkers, as well as a 
reliable replacement warhead (RRW) that would be optimized not for the greatest yield-
to-weight ratio but instead for reliability after a period of long-term storage.  Both 
programs, however, failed to receive the approval of the U.S. Congress.194
In the spirit of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, in 2002 President Bush and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT) in Moscow.  Although the Moscow Treaty imposed a lower ceiling on nuclear 
warheads than previous treaties—2,200 weapons by the end of 2012—the treaty lacked 
the kind of robust verification regime of the START series.
 
195
China’s reaction to these developments was mixed.  While Beijing supported 
Washington’s efforts on arms control treaties, it reacted with “shock” to the leak of the 
2001 NPR which purported to include China into the SIOP.  For its part, Japan (as with 
other U.S. allies) had very little to say on the matter.
 
196
B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE POST-9/11 ERA 
 
Although the events of September 11 helped to emphasize President Bush’s belief 
in the necessity of a missile defense system, he had announced its acceleration before the 
attacks, on May 1, 2001, as discussed in the preceding chapter.  Following the third 
successful test (out of five attempts) of the U.S. Air Force’s NMD system, in December 
2001 Bush gave the requisite six-month notice of his intention to withdraw the United 
States from the ABM Treaty.197
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had successfully demonstrated their components of TMD, using the Aegis Weapon 
System and the Standard Missile (SM-3) and the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) 
missile, respectively.198
1. Japan’s Increasing Involvement 
 
Throughout the early years of the twenty-first century, the United States 
encouraged Japan to increase its participation in missile defense from research to joint 
development and, ultimately, employment.  While Prime Minister Koizumi was in many 
ways the most pro-Washington leader of the Diet in decades, joint development and 
deployment of missile defense was initially stymied for a variety of reasons.  First, joint 
development came up against Japan’s tight controls on the export of military weapons 
and technology, first imposed under Prime Minister Sato in 1967.  While Tokyo created 
an exception in order to allow Japanese participation in the development of SDI in the 
1980s, the arms control policy nevertheless prevented third-party transfers—in other 
words, missile defense technology developed by Japan and shared with the United States 
could not then be implemented in a system shared between the Washington and its 
NATO allies.199  Second, many members of the Diet feared that the intelligence sharing 
necessary to joint deployment of TMD with the United States would implicitly involve 
Tokyo in Washington’s NMD, possibly running counter to Japan’s self-imposed 
prohibition on the use of collective self-defense.200
Japan’s resistance to joint development and deployment soon changed.  Toward 
the end of 2002, North Korea announced that it was reactivating the nuclear facilities that 
had laid dormant since the establishment of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and on 
January 10, 2003, Pyongyang formally announced that it was withdrawing from the 
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NPT.201  On December 17, 2002, the United States announced it was going ahead with 
development and deployment of a missile defense system centered on ground- and sea-
based interceptors for defense against SRBM attacks, as well as ground-based 
interceptors for use against ICBM attacks.202  Throughout 2003, Washington and Tokyo 
engaged in discussions over missile defense; by the end of the year, the Koizumi 
government determined that Japan could not afford to either forgo a missile defense 
system or pursue a system of its own; greater cooperation—even joint development and 
deployment—was necessary.  On December 19, Tokyo agreed to joint development of a 
missile defense system with the United States, and that the components of missile defense 
would be exempt from the Sato-era arms control policy, including the prohibition on 
third-party transfers.203
2. Alliance “Transformation and Realignment” 
 
In the mid-2000s Japanese defense policy and the Washington-Tokyo alliance 
both began a period of reorientation.  In December 2004, the Japanese Cabinet introduced 
a revised National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) for FY2005.  The new NDPG 
was, to a certain extent, a reiteration of past practice and commitments, explaining in 
multiple places Japan’s continued reliance on U.S. extended deterrence and joint 
development of a BMD system. In its discussion on the “security environment 
surrounding Japan,” however, the FY2005 NDPG did make two declarations that 
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“uncertain” situation across the Taiwan Strait.  Second, in addition to North Korea’s 
many threats, the modernization of China’s strategic and naval forces were identified as 
trends to which Tokyo must “remain attentive.”204
The implication of a “China threat” was reiterated in February 2005, this time 
through the forum of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC).  In the joint 
statement released on February 19, the allied ministers of defense and foreign affairs 
explicated the allies’ common strategic objectives.  Enumerated in this list encouraging 
China to “play a responsible and constructive role” in the international community, 
“improv[ing] the transparency of its military affairs,” and the “peaceful resolution of 
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait.”
 
205  At the SCC meeting in October 2005, the 
process of strengthening the alliance was given a formal title: “transformation and 
realignment.”  The subject of the meeting was to develop means, not justifications, for 
increased cooperation between the United States and Japan.  As a result, while neither 
China nor Taiwan are mentioned as concerns, the joint statement does reiterate the 
continuing provision of the nuclear umbrella and the future of cooperation on missile 
defense.206
If the allies needed additional justification to continue the transformation and 
realignment process, it came in summer and fall of 2006.  On July 4, North Korea 
conducted its first test of an ICBM since 1998, launching a series of Taepodong-1 and 
other, shorter-range missiles.  Three months later, on October 9, Pyongyang announced 
that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon.  In response, President Bush reiterated 
that same day Washington’s commitment to its nuclear guarantee; a week later, Secretary 
 
                                                 
204  National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005–, Reference 9 in Japan Ministry of Defense, 
Defense of Japan 2009, 403–4, 406.  The NDPG is the successor to the two previous National Defense 
Program Outlines (NDPO) of FY1976 and FY1996.  While the English rendering was changed in 2004 
from “outline” to “guideline,” the Japanese term remained the same; it is not believed that this change in 
rendering has any significance. 
205 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, 
February 19, 2005,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html (accessed 
November 15, 2010). 
206 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, 
October 29, 2005,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0510.html (accessed 
November 15, 2010). 
 73 
of State Condoleezza Rice emphasized that “[t]he United States has the will and the 
capability to meet the full range, and I underscore the full range, of its deterrence and 
security commitment to Japan.”207  At the next meeting of the SCC, in May 2007, the 
allies again “reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities—both nuclear and 
non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended 
deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.”208  Although North 
Korea’s tests did not involve an explicit acceleration of U.S.-Japan BMD development, 
the aftermath of the crisis did witness the first deployment of PAC-3 batteries in Japan, as 
well as the first joint test of the Aegis sea-based TMD system.209
3. China’s Muted Response 
 
In contrast to its vocal protests throughout the late 1990s, China’s response to 
developments in America’s missile defense program in the twenty-first century was more 
muted.  Following the formal withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, the 
only official statement noted that Beijing was “regretful” over the decision and its hope 
that Washington would act “prudently.”210  Brad Roberts attributes this “quiet 
acquiescence” to a variety of factors: China’s belief that its “worst fears seemed to be 
coming true” about a pro-Taiwan administration in Washington; an attempt to reset Sino-
American relations in the wake of President Bush’s post-September 11 “with us or 
against us” view of international relations; and recognition that if Sino-Russian protests 
had thus far failed to stall U.S. missile defense efforts, they were unlikely to succeed.211
Despite this muted diplomatic response, China has nevertheless made efforts 
toward both overcoming missile defense and developing a system of its own.  Beijing has 
executed an ambitious strategic force modernization program: the solid-fueled DF-31 was 
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successful tested in 1999, the longer-range DF-31A is under development, and the JL-2 
SLBM is expected to enter service soon.212  In 2006, China was reported to be pursuing 
various BMD countermeasures, including improved missile accuracy, “cold-launch” 
techniques to delay boost-phase detection of a launch, flattening the trajectory of the DF-
31 to frustrate mid-course intercept, and “infrared stealth” technology.213  In addition, 
there is evidence that Beijing has been pursuing its own missile defense system.  On 
January 11, 2007, the PLA successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system, 
shooting down a defunct weather satellite at an altitude of over 500 nautical miles.214  In 
its 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR), the U.S. Department of 
Defense reported that China had successfully tested a ground-based intercept—the initial 
step in developing a missile defense system—on January 11, 2010.215
China has also responded to the alliance “transformation and realignment” 
process.  In response to Tokyo’s FY2005 NDPG, naming China as a specific concern, 
Beijing issued a statement protesting the negative characterization of China in the NDPG.  
  Keeping in mind 
the previously-cited fifteen to twenty year interval between project initiation and first 
successful test, these programs may have been started in response to the late 1990s 
increase in U.S. missile defense programs, with seemingly coincidental timing.  The lack 
of transparency in China’s weapons programs, however, makes this difficult to judge. 
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Following the February 2005 SCC statement, which incorporated the Taiwan Strait as an 
alliance interest, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing specifically warned Japan against 
“challenging China’s core national interest in Taiwan.”216
Despite the military advances China has made, there is little evidence that a 
negative security spiral is currently underway.  In 2008 the RAND Corporation 
undertook a study on the reactions of U.S. allies in the Pacific to the rise of China.  The 
project concluded that, while the growth of China’s military power (including nuclear 
forces) is undeniable, there has been little appreciable change in behavior—in terms of 
economic interaction, military expenditures—to suggest that U.S. allies in the region feel 
immediately threatened by China.  One could thus conclude that, to the extent that the 
China-Japan security relationship can be measured in terms of military expenditures, the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella (including missile defense) has not exacerbated tensions between 
Beijing and Tokyo.
  As a result of Beijing’s 
protests, we can consider these points to represent periods of feuding friendship between 
China and Japan. 
217
C. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE 2001 
 
In addition to discord between Beijing and Tokyo over the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and BMD, the first part of the decade got off to a rough start.  In April 2001, shortly after 
he took office, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro followed through on his campaign 
promise to visit Yasukuni Shrine.  This took place despite repeated, public protests from 
Beijing and Seoul both before and after the visit; as a result, China suspended military-to-
military interactions for a year.  This did not stop Koizumi from making further visits; in 
April 2002, January 2003, January 2004, and October 2005 he again visited Yasukuni, 
again suffering the consequence of diplomatic rebuke from Beijing.  Bilateral tensions 
also suffered in May 2002 in a dispute over the forcible entrance of Chinese police into 
the Japanese consulate in Shenyang.218
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entered Japanese territorial waters, sparking a minor diplomatic exchange.219  In April 
2005 a new junior high school textbook was released which, to many, appeared to gloss 
over many of Japan’s atrocities from 1931 to 1945; the result was a wave of popular 
protests in China, including the largest gathering of protestors in Tiananmen Square since 
the June 1989 crackdown.220
After Koizumi, more moderate politicians ascended to the prime minister’s office, 
leading to a significant number of positive interactions going forward.  In March 2006 
Beijing suggested to Tokyo a joint exploration program for the Senkaku islands; the plan 
was ultimately agreed to in June 2008.  In November 2007, a PLAN warship made the 
first-ever visit of a Chinese warship to Japan; this was reciprocated in June 2008, when a 
JMSDF vessel visited a Chinese port for the first time.
 
221  Bilateral defense exchanges 
increased toward the end of the decade, with major summits between China and Japan’s 
respective defense ministers held in May 2007 and March 2009.222
The trend in the China-Japan security relationship thus reflects the personalities 
and politics of the individuals involved.  While Koizumi presided over Japan’s 
diplomacy, the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo was almost always that of 
feuding friends.  On the other hand, the premierships of Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso 
Taro, Hatoyama Yukio, and now Kan Naoto have seen a relationship that has been 
largely that of cooperative friends, despite Japan’s increasing involvement and joint 
deployment of BMD with the United States. 
 
D. “A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS”? 
1. The Prague Initiative 
Speaking to an audience in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama 
declared “America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without 
nuclear weapons.”  Admitting that such a goal might not be met soon or even in his 
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lifetime, Obama nevertheless committed to making visible progress on meeting 
Washington’s Article VI obligations under the NPT to disarm itself.223
A year later, the United States appeared ready to make progress on that 
commitment.  In its 2010 NPR, Washington announced that, in view of the radically 
changed strategic environment since the end of the Cold War—namely, the end of the 
U.S.-Soviet rivalry and greatly improved conventional weapons—it was “now prepared 
to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative security assurance’ by declaring that the United 
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states 
that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation 
obligations.”
   
224  While this would seem to mark a radical change from typical U.S. 
ambiguity regarding its nuclear deterrent policy, the 2010 NPR describes several caveats.  
First, this does not constitute an NFU policy; there is still a “narrow range of 
contingencies” in which Washington’s nuclear arsenal would be used to deter a 
conventional, chemical, or biological attack by states not covered by the negative security 
assurance (that is, states possessing nuclear weapons or not in compliance with their NPT 
obligations).  Second, the NPR does not express Washington’s intentional to unilaterally 
disarm: “[t]he fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and 
partners.”  Third, “the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the 
assurance that may be warranted” by the emergence of new chemical or biological 
threats.225  Finally, the document underscores that the United States would continue its 
provision of extended deterrence to its “allies and partners.”226
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NPR does not represent a radical change from previous U.S. deterrence policy, but 
nevertheless represents a step toward reducing the importance of nuclear weapons in 
security strategy.227
In February 2010, a few months before the NPR and concurrent with its 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), the administration released its first-ever 
BMDR.  The report goes to great lengths to explain that missile defense is oriented 
against the regional threats posed by North Korea, Iran, and Syria, and specifically not 
against Russia and China, going so far as to suggest that Russia could itself be included 
in missile defense “if political circumstances make that possible.”
 
228  While the report 
may have soothed Moscow’s fears, it made little attempt to quell Beijing’s concerns.  
First, China was not invited to participate in missile defense in the same way Russia was, 
although the report does state that “[m]aintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China 
relationship as important to the Administration as maintaining strategic stability with 
other major powers.”229  Nevertheless, aside from the regional threats that BMD is 
notionally targeted against, only China is singled out for its “particularly concern[ing]” 
strategic modernization program and the “growing imbalance of power across the Taiwan 
Strait;” the report expressing concern that “Chinese missiles will be capable of reaching 
not just important Taiwan military and civilian facilities but also U.S. and allied military 
installations in the region.”230
2. Hedges on the Prague Initiative 
  This fuels further fears in Beijing about the implicit 
extension of BMD protection to Taiwan. 
While the United States has declared its official vision of a world without nuclear 
weapons, it has both maintained a significant hedge against future threats and made some 
effort to reassure allies that the promise of extended deterrence and missile defense will 
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continue as long as there remain any nuclear weapons in the world.  For its part, Japan 
has welcomed both.  As a long-time supporter of non-proliferation and disarmament, 
Tokyo publically praised the Prague Initiative as a step toward the global nuclear 
disarmament that Japan has pushed for since 1954.  At the same time, Japan has always 
been quick to publically affirm its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  Following 
ceremonies observing the sixty-fifth anniversary of Hiroshima nuclear bombing on 
August 6, 2010—the first time an official U.S. representative was in attendance—
Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto was pressed to abandon the nuclear umbrella; in 
response, Kan actually reiterated Japan’s reliance on American nuclear weapons, stating 
that nuclear deterrence is essential to Japan’s security as long as nuclear weapons exist in 
the world.231
For its part, Beijing had a mixed response to the Prague Initiative.  The concept of 
global nuclear disarmament is in keeping with Chinese declarations dating to Zhou 
Enlai’s announcement of the first nuclear test in 1964.  Yet, the official newspaper of the 
CCP expressed doubt about the credibility of Obama’s commitment on two counts.  First, 
Washington’s continued pursuit of ballistic missile defense is seen as running counter to 
the “spirit of nuclear disarmament,” owing to Russia’s withdrawal from START II after 
the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty.  Second, the article notes that the U.S. 
budget for 2010 contained $7 billion for nuclear “projects,” an increase from the previous 
year.  Although the article explains that the budget includes funding for civil nuclear 
research and security of the warhead stockpile in addition to a new, more secure warhead, 
it is clear that Beijing remains skeptical about the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
 
232
3. Phased, Adaptive Approach and North Korea’s Nuclear Test 
 
The day that President Obama announced his Prague Initiative, North Korea 
attempted to launch a satellite into space atop a Taepodong-1 ICBM; the launch was a 
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failure, but the missile nevertheless passed through Japanese airspace.  On May 24, 
Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear detonation, followed in July by a series of 
Taepodong-1 tests.233  It was in this context that Obama announced the “phased, adaptive 
approach” (PAA), a drastic reduction of the scope of BMD in Europe.  Rather than 
fielding yet-to-be-proven ground-based sensors and interceptors in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia (which Russia vehemently opposed), the United States would instead 
focus on rapidly deploying a more limited system based on the successful, sea-based 
Aegis BMD project, with options for expansion as the ground-based program is 
perfected.234  The lack of a response by Japan or China to the PAA is, to a certain extent, 
surprising.  Of course, the 2010 BMDR recognized that PAA was intended only for 
Europe, at least for the time being, and there has been no indication of a pending 
extension of the reduced missile defense shield to Asia.235
E. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
 
In the period since September 11, 2001, the China-Japan security relationship has 
seen significant oscillation.  Although Beijing and Tokyo have remained long-term 
friends, short-term relations have been characterized by alternating bouts of feud and 
cooperation.  Many significant summits and military-to-military exchanges took place, 
fostering improved relations; at the same time, provocative statements and actions by 
Japanese leaders, especially visits to Yasukuni shrine, led to angry rhetoric from Beijing.  
Despite these frosty relations, however, bilateral trade has continued to grow, with most 
of Japan’s trade now conducted with China. 
The United States’ nuclear umbrella has seen a significant shift.  The decreased 
importance of nuclear weapons accorded by the 2001 and 2010 NPRs raised some 
questions about the long-term credibility of America’s deterrent; the lack of any 
modernization program whatsoever further reinforces those concerns.  Nevertheless, the 
 
                                                 
233 Wade L. Huntley, “Bucks for the Bang: North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Northeast Asian 
Military Spending,” Asian Perspective 33, no. 4 (December, 2009), 152. 
234 United States Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 24. 
235 United States Department of Department, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 24–6. 
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ongoing development of ballistic missile defense systems suggests that Washington will 
continue to provide protection against nuclear attacks on its allies, whether in the form of 
deterrence or defense. 
This focus on missile defense is often credited with motivating China to 
modernize its strategic nuclear force.  While U.S. missile defense may be a partial 
justification for Beijing’s modernization, this program—which has been underway for 
over two decades—does not appear to have been appreciably accelerated in the face of 
Washington’s progress on BMD.  At the same time, while China’s modernization might 
be threatening to Japan, Tokyo’s major decisions on participation in Washington’s BMD 
program appear keyed to events on the Korean peninsula, and the major exchanges of 
negative diplomatic rhetoric between Beijing and Tokyo have not been over missile 
defense.  Defining U.S. nuclear deterrence broadly to include missile defense, it has had a 
weak effect of exacerbation on the China-Japan relationship.  This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
China’s missile defense program is almost certainly a response to U.S. missile 
defense initiatives—Beijing has not demonstrated a propensity to exceed the 
technological capabilities of the superpowers, only to maintain the balance of its  
“minimum deterrence” against the changing strategic capabilities of the United States and 
Russia, and the United States is the only nation currently spearheading a missile defense 
program.236
                                                 
236 Chu and Rong, 169. 
  The relationship of BMD to China’s strategic modernization, however, is 
less clear; as discussed in the previous chapter, the DF-31 and JL-2 programs were begun 
in mid-1980s in anticipation of changes in the strategic balance which would attend the 
implementation of SDI; Beijing’s ASAT and its own BMD program may be extensions 
of this response, a reaction to the late-1990s increase in U.S. and Japanese interest in 
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Key: Arrows indicate influence:           Amelioration        Exacerbation, thicker arrows indicate stronger influence  
Figure 5.   U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 2001–present 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the historical development of the U.S. guaranteed nuclear 
deterrent as well as the evolution of the China-Japan security relationship, this chapter 
will summarize those findings and draw out the long-term trends in the interaction of 
these two variables.  Specifically, it will analyze whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella has 
exerted influence on relations between Beijing and Tokyo, and what the nature of that 
influence was.  This chapter will examine the conditions under which Washington’s 
guaranteed deterrent had stronger (or weaker) influence, and will identify some policy 
recommendations. 
A. OVERARCHING TRENDS IN THE CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY 
RELATIONSHIP 
At the strategic level, the China-Japan security relationship is clearly 
characterized by the gradual improvement in relations.  In August 1945 China and Japan 
were in the midst of almost a decade of war.  This clearly hostile relationship gave way to 
one of mutual ignorance, first when Japan lost its sovereignty at the end of the war in 
September 1945, but reinforced in 1951 at San Francisco and again in 1952, when Tokyo 
failed to resolve its relationship with Beijing and instead signed a peace treaty with the 
Nationalists in Taipei.  This state of ignorance persisted for twenty years, until Prime 
Minister Tanaka’s landmark visit to Beijing in September 1972, formally establishing 
diplomatic relations between China and Japan for the first time since 1937.  This state of 
long-term friendship—that is, mutual recognition—continues to the present. 
While the long-term relationship between Beijing and Tokyo shows a consistent 
progression toward improved relations, the short-term relationship is characterized by 
frequent oscillation between cooperation and conflict.  In the period of strategic mutual 
ignorance (from 1945 to 1972), events such as China’s first nuclear test were punctuated 
with developments such as increasing bilateral trade, moving back and forth from being 
tacit enemies to tacit friends.  This pattern has not changed in the era of strategic 
friendship.  While Beijing and Tokyo were cooperative friends upon establishing normal 
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diplomatic relations in 1971, by 1989 they were feuding friends in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown.  This pattern repeated in the early 1990s, with Tokyo 
quickly repealing its sanctions only to reimpose them in the context of China’s continued 
nuclear testing and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis.  Vacillation between feuding friends 
and cooperative friends also characterizes the early twenty-first century; while relations 
under Prime Minister Koizumi’s caused increasing tensions (such as antagonistic visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine), Tokyo and Beijing have nevertheless been able to achieve several 
significant “firsts,” including unprecedented military-to-military exchanges and an 
agreement on joint mineral exploration in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  Most 
recently (as of this writing), the relationship between China and Japan has again taken a 
turn toward feuding friends: following the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with a 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) cutter in the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Japan arrested the fishing 
vessel’s master, and Beijing has threatened to cut off exports of rare earth materials to 
Tokyo.237
Out of this trend analysis come a few significant observations with respect to the 
interstate relationship classification scheme introduced in Figure 1.  First, improvement 
in the strategic relationship from ignorant to friends did not occur until the short-term 
relationship had become more cooperative, i.e., tacit friends.  This suggests, not 
surprisingly, that an improved short-term relationship can open the door to better a long-
term relationship as well.  What remains unclear, at least empirically, is whether the long-
term relationship can improve at a time of short-term conflict, i.e., a transition from tacit 
enemies to feuding friends.  Second, the progression in the long-term relationship was 
always in a positive direction, first from enemies to ignorant, and then from ignorant to 
friends.  The obvious caveat, however, is that just because the China-Japan security 
relationship improved at the strategic level does not mean that this course is irreversible.  
One can easily think of examples where states broke off diplomatic relations after many 
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years of burgeoning economic and political interaction (one need only look at Europe in 
the first half of the twentieth century for a handful of such instances).  In the end, aside 
from serving as a useful tool for labeling, further research is necessary beyond the very 
narrow scope of this thesis in order to support or refute any weightier importance for the 
classification scheme.238
B. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES’ NUCLEAR 
UMBRELLA 
 
The United States’ nuclear deterrent has undergone significant change in the last 
65 years.  Beginning with a handful of weapons in the late 1940s, by the mid-1950s 
Washington had thousands of weapons and was in the midst of an arms race with the 
Soviet Union.  The quantitative and qualitative improvements in the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
continued throughout the 1980s, growing to encompass a “strategic triad” of delivery 
vehicles as well as technological improvements such as MIRVs.  Despite this ever-
stronger materiel capability, the advent of arms control negotiations in the 1970s led to 
Washington’s allies questioning the credibility of its nuclear guarantee.  In the waning 
years of the Cold War and the immediate post-Soviet era, these arms control treaties took 
a significant turn, with the limits imposed by the START agreements, leading to the first 
quantitative reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  At the same time it was 
reducing the importance of nuclear weapons, Washington became increasingly interested 
in missile defense systems to provide protection against regional threats without the risk 
of sparking a nuclear war.  The most recent round of arms control negotiations—resulting 
in the New START—was accompanied by the 2010 NPR, which stated America’s 
intention to pursue a world with no nuclear weapons at all. 
The nuclear guarantee that Washington provides to Tokyo has similarly evolved.  
Its origins are found in the vaguely-worded commitments of the 1951 MST and the subtle 
threats and intimations about the use of nuclear weapons against China in a conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait.  By 1968 extended deterrence was an explicit component of the U.S.-Japan 
                                                 
238 Such a research project, if undertaken, should account for instances where states have normal 
diplomatic relations but are nevertheless not on any terms approaching that of “friend,” as was the case 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  See note 15, above. 
 86 
alliance; even at times when the United States appears to be withdrawing from a large 
role in regional affairs (as with the Guam Doctrine), Washington and Tokyo have been 
quick to reiterate the centrality of the nuclear umbrella to the alliance relationship.  As the 
U.S. conception of deterrence has grown to encompass missile defenses, the burden of 
holding up the nuclear umbrella is now shared, in small part, by the nation reaping its 
benefits.  In the context of President Obama’s Prague Initiative, both the United States 
and Japan have reiterated the desirability of a nuclear-weapons-free world but also the 
necessity of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as there remain nuclear 
weapons in the world.  For its part, Japan has maintained a hedge against future changes 
in U.S. extended deterrence, maintaining a latent capability to militarize its civilian 
nuclear industry.  
How have these changes in the U.S. guaranteed nuclear deterrent influenced the 
China-Japan security relationship?  In Figure 6, the major changes in Sino-Japanese 
relations are compared side-by-side with key changes in Washington’s extended 
deterrent.  Constructed very narrowly, the U.S. guarantee to use nuclear weapons to deter 
or defend an attack on Japan has had precious little influence on the relationship between 
Tokyo and Beijing.  In this strict construct, the most significant impact of Washington’s 
nuclear deterrent has been Japan’s failure to obtain nuclear weapons.  The provision of a 
nuclear umbrella obviated the need for Japan to obtain its own strategic deterrent, and 
thus removed the potential for a Sino-Japanese nuclear arms race like that between 
Washington and Moscow.  This influence should not be seen as decisive, however; not 
only was the U.S. nuclear guarantee given grudgingly (and only after repeated inquiries 
by Tokyo), but it also was one of many influences at work.  The absence of a Japanese 
nuclear weapons program may also be due to the “nuclear allergy” of public opinion, the 
constraints on military spending under the Yoshida Doctrine, and of course the negative 
international reactions of obtaining nuclear weapons.  And while Tokyo has determined 
time and again that it is not in Japan’s national interest to obtain nuclear weapons, 
Japan’s leaders have also emphasized the need to maintain the scientific and industrial 
capacity to become a nuclear power on short notice should the strategic situation change.  
While the direction of influence in this instance would be to ameliorate tensions between 
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Beijing and Tokyo and the magnitude could be judged as moderate, one must 
nevertheless keep in mind that Japan retains, in theory, the option to go nuclear.  
By constructing the independent variable somewhat more broadly, to include 
nuclear guarantees from Washington to any ally, we include in our field of view the 
“nuclear blackmail” of the 1950s.  Here is the most acute example of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent exerting influence on the China-Japan security relationship.  We know that 
Eisenhower was intentionally issuing threats of nuclear force in the context of the Korean 
War, the Indochina conflict, and a showdown over Taiwan.  We also know that these 
threats prompted China to pursue its nuclear weapons program, and we know that the 
advent of a nuclear Beijing caused unease in Tokyo.  In this case, the direction of 
influence was clearly to exacerbate the already-hostile relationship between Tokyo and 
Beijing; one could argue (with some stretching) that as a result, any tensions over China’s 
nuclear program is due to the fact that it has a nuclear program at all, which can be traced 
back to the impact of Washington’s nuclear blackmail.  The magnitude of this influence 
could rightly be called significant or even great; it drove another state to devote its 
limited financial, scientific, and industrial resources to a nuclear weapons program.  This 
magnitude is tempered, however, by the recognition (at least implicit) of the fact that a 
Chinese nuclear program was likely an unintended consequence of Washington’s nuclear 
threats.  
Expanding our definition of nuclear deterrent again to include missile defense 
systems introduces the changes that characterized the post-Cold War era.  The 
progressive decrease in the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal correlates with a general period of cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing.  This 
correlation, however, may have as much to do with the radically altered strategic 
environment after the Cold War; the decrease in the nuclear arsenal and the improvement 
in Sino-Japanese relations may both be indicators of some larger influence at work in the 
international system.  Similarly, the relative worsening in tensions between Japan and 
China coincides with an increasing interest by the United States on missile defense in the 
late 1990s and 2000s.  Beijing certainly issued some negative rhetoric on the matter, and  
there is limited evidence that China has increased the pace of its strategic modernization 
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program; but the most important and highly-funded projects—the DF-31 and the JL-2—
have been underway since the mid-1980s.  Indeed, it appears that, while Chinese sources 
do not explicitly say as much, Beijing’s strategic modernization was a response to the 
Reagan-era interest in SDI.  In this sense, to the extent that Japan would later feel 
threatened by China’s strategic modernization throughout the post-Cold War era, we can 
consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella to have exacerbated tensions between Tokyo and 
Beijing.  The magnitude of this influence, however, is considered moderate; China’s 
modernization was begun in the context of general strategic instability, not a perceived 
threat from the United States; Japanese policymakers and public opinion polls indicate 
that North Korea, and not China, is still the main object of BMD.  In addition, many 
changes in the relationship can be more clearly drawn back to bilateral issues, from 
Yasukuni and the history textbook controversies, to the conflict and cooperation over the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 
By including in our view of U.S. nuclear deterrence the actual use of nuclear 
weapons, we thus introduce the events of August and September 1945 into our analysis.  
This yields an additional ameliorative influence of significant magnitude, as the bombing 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a leading (though by no means the only) cause of the 
surrender of Japan and the end of the war between Tokyo and her neighbors.  This 
definition of nuclear deterrence is not only the broadest but also, in a sense, the polar 
opposite of a nuclear guarantee to protect Japan—in this case, Japan was the objective 
against which nuclear weapons were used, not the subject of a guarantee of protection or 
defense. 
Outside of these instances of evident influence, the other major changes in the 
China-Japan security relationship appear unrelated to changes in the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella; at the same time, significant changes in Washington’s nuclear deterrent are not 
always followed by changes in the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing.  The causal 
mechanism for these changes seems creditable to either U.S. diplomacy more broadly or 
events of a bilateral, and sometimes domestic, nature.  Sino-Japanese normalization was a 
result not of U.S. nuclear guarantees, but of President Nixon’s opening to China, and of a 
more general fragmentation in the Communist bloc.  The major break in relations 
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between Tokyo and Beijing in 1989 stemmed not from Japan’s involvement in SDI or the 
relative decline of the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but rather from the crackdown at 
Tiananmen and a wave of global sanctions against China.  Even when the U.S.-Japan 
alliance has expanded the  nuclear umbrella in ways that are antagonistic to China—
namely, cooperation on BMD—the major changes in Tokyo’s participation were 
precipitated by the actions of North Korea; only recently has Beijing’s modernization 
entered into Tokyo’s  strategic calculus (at least, to the extent of public documents such 
as the NDPG).   
Nevertheless, from the foregoing analysis, a few trends can be observed.  Under 
what conditions does the U.S. nuclear guarantee influence the China-Japan security 
relationships?  First, the magnitude of influence between the variables is strongest when 
China and Japan are already on poor terms, either long-term ignorant or outright enemies.  
This was demonstrated in the 1945 use of nuclear weapons to force Japan’s surrender, as 
well as the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958.  In both cases the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella (or, in the former, use of nuclear weapons) caused a significant change in 
behavior in one of the other states.  Second, while the strongest instance of influence (the 
lack of an independent Japanese nuclear weapons program) has been to ameliorate 
tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the influence most often exerted has been to 
exacerbate, even if that influence was weaker than that of amelioration.  Under the 
narrowest definition, the United States’ nuclear deterrent has ameliorated Sino-Japanese 
tensions once, but in a significant way—preventing, to a large extent, the Japanese 
government from pursuing its own strategic deterrent.  However, when constructed more 
broadly, the United States’ nuclear umbrella has served to exacerbate tensions at least 
four times, namely China’s nuclear weapons program, the advent of SDI in 1983, the 
increase in Japanese involvement in 1998, and joint U.S.-Japanese development and 
deployment of a BMD system since 2006.  Looking at the broadest definition possible for 
U.S. nuclear deterrence, the atomic bombings of August 1945 served to ameliorate Sino-
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The finally tally of U.S. influence on the China-Japan security relationship is thus  
two instances of significant amelioration and four instances of moderate or weak 
exacerbation.  How do these influences balance against each other?  Of the examples of 
amelioration, only the use of nuclear weapons caused a change in the strategic 
relationship between China and Japan, shifting from a state of hostile enemies to one of 
tacit relations.  The second instance of amelioration—preventing a Japan armed with 
nuclear weapons—did not itself lead to a change in the relationship; although it is a 
counterfactual, one can easily imagine the negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations in 
the event of a Japanese nuclear test.  The four cases of exacerbation, however, resulted in 
changes only in the short-term relationship between Beijing and Tokyo, and then only 
served to exacerbate tensions.   
While the trends observed appear at first to confirm the conventional wisdom 
demonstrated in Chapter I—that is, the nuclear umbrella both ameliorates and 
exacerbates the Sino-Japanese security dilemma—the findings in fact demonstrate some 
significant qualifications to this conventional wisdom.  No change in U.S. posture has, by 
itself, served to both ameliorate and exacerbate; individual changes have influence only 
in one or the other direction.  Further, the fact that instances of exacerbation have 
occurred more frequently than those of amelioration might suggest that it is thus easier 
for the nuclear umbrella to exacerbate rather than ameliorate, contrary to the general 
assumption that nuclear weapons bring stability.  This suggests that policymakers should 
avoid using extended deterrence as a tool to shape this relationship, which is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
C. CHALLENGES TO THE ASSESSMENT 
In the course of this thesis, several limits to the assessment were discovered. First, 
the lack of transparency—on both sides—makes it hard to know what the other side is 
doing at a given point in time.  Second, there significant time-lag between when influence 
is exerted and when a resulting change is manifested, making it more difficult to gauge 
whether and how much of an influence is had.  A perfect example is the U.S. “nuclear 
blackmail” of the 1950s.  Washington’s threats of nuclear force in 1954–55 and 1958 
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directed contributed to Beijing’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  While the decision to 
obtain weapons was made in 1955, the result—a nuclear detonation—was not seen until 
1964, almost ten years after Washington’s influence was exerted! In a certain sense, we 
can judge the U.S. nuclear guarantee (to Taiwan) as the cause of China’s nuclear program 
only because Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai told us so.  At the same time, China’s strategic 
modernization today might simply be continuation of programs started decades ago, 
either in response to SDI or just in the pursuit of the nuclear deterrent that rightfully 
belongs to a great power.  Intelligence in this regard is indispensible; although China did 
not publically announce its nuclear program in 1955, by 1960 the U.S. intelligence 
community was well aware of China’s ongoing nuclear research and testing projects.  
Similarly, although programs such as the Xia SSBN or the DF-31 ICBM have come 
online recently, intelligence analysis informs us that these programs were begun at least 
two decades before the fruits (rotten though they may be) were borne. 
The bottom line here is that hindsight is 20/20.  Because of the long lead time in 
developing new weapons programs, it may not be possible to see correlation (much less 
causation) for several decades after the influence has been exerted or a change has taken 
place.  As additional documents related to Chinese and U.S. nuclear programs in the 
1980s and 1990s are declassified, it may be worthwhile to revisit the question of 
influence in the China-Japan security relationship. 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the analytic conclusions presented above, a few policy 
recommendations can be made: 
1. Do Not Take the Nuclear Umbrella as a Microcosm of U.S. Influence 
The first recommendation is that policymakers should not take the nuclear 
umbrella as a microcosm of U.S. influence; that is, the way in which the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella exerts influence may not be the same as the other tools of influence available to 
Washington.  The United States has the full range of national power—diplomatic, 
economic, etc.—at its disposal in attempting to drive the international outcomes it 
desires.  These tools may be both more effective and more efficient than the nuclear 
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umbrella because they are more easily targeted specifically at the China-Japan security 
relationship.  Diplomatic efforts or trade barriers, for example, can easily be deployed 
against Beijing (or Tokyo) alone.  The U.S. nuclear deterrent, on the other hand, is more 
of a blunt instrument; indeed, the changes in Washington’s nuclear posture since at least 
the 1960s have impacted Europe as well as Asia.  While this thesis has investigated the 
influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the China-Japan security relationship, 
additional avenues for research could include particular economic tools, or perhaps the 
use of diplomatic rhetoric alone. 
2. But Do Not Underestimate the Influence of the Nuclear Umbrella, 
Either 
This is not to say that nuclear deterrent policy is unimportant or inconsequential.  
A corollary to the first recommendation is that policymakers must not underestimate the 
influence of the nuclear umbrella; indeed, this thesis has found that in a few, limited 
instances extended deterrence has, at least in part, generated a change in the Sino-
Japanese relationship.  The strongest influence was to ameliorate tensions, as with the 
end of the Pacific War and the absence of Japanese strategic deterrent.  The influence 
most frequently felt, however, was exacerbation, although this influence was only felt on 
the short-term nature of the relationship.  This is significantly more nuanced than the 
conventional wisdom that the nuclear umbrella both ameliorates and exacerbates.  At the 
same time, we cannot rule out the fact that as the nuclear balance shifts—with 
Washington possessing ever fewer warheads and Beijing ever more—this pattern of 
influence may shift as well.  For example, while missile defense has so far not 
exacerbated tensions to the point of changing the long-term relationship, it is far from 
certain that this will always be the case.  Indeed, one can easily conceive of a situation in 
which missile defense pushes the relationship to the brink—Japanese intelligence used by 
a U.S. missile defense system to defend against a missile attack on Taiwan, for example. 
3. Do Not Expect Results That are Simple, Expected, or Immediate 
A partial result of the nuanced influence the U.S. nuclear guarantee exerts on the 
China-Japan security relationship is that, when influence is applied—whether 
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intentionally or not—the results are often complex, unanticipated, and take a long time to 
be realized.  This is demonstrated in at least two instances.  The first is Eisenhower’s 
nuclear blackmail; while the intended result was that China would not attack Taiwan, the 
actual result was more wide-ranging.  Mao decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program; 
nine years later China detonated its first nuclear device, prompting Japan to seek out 
nuclear assurances from the United States—which further exacerbated tensions between 
Tokyo and Beijing.  The second example is Reagan’s SDI, a change in the nuclear 
umbrella which was not even directed at China.  Yet the threat of strategic instability 
caused Beijing to begin a robust modernization program aimed at enhancing the 
credibility and survivability of its deterrent against a Soviet missile defense system.  
Nevertheless, two decades later, the fruits of modernization were born in the form of the 
DF-31 and JL-2 missiles, prompting Japan to view China more warily and (to a limited 
degree) increase its cooperation on BMD with the United States.  Because it takes so long 
for influence to be felt, the strategic situation may have changed drastically, thus 
producing results which were unanticipated. 
4. Be as Transparent as Possible 
To the extent that Washington does not desire spiraling tensions between Beijing 
and Tokyo,239
                                                 
239 This assumes, of course, that Washington desires a good Sino-Japanese relationship.  It is not 
impossible, however, to imagine a situation where increased tensions between Tokyo and Beijing may well 
be to Washington’s advantage; trade or foreign investments are but a few examples.   
 and despite the conclusion that the nuclear umbrella has relatively 
circumscribed influence in that relationship, there is nevertheless one way in which the 
United States can make changes to its extended nuclear deterrent and mitigate the 
potential for exacerbating tensions in the China-Japan security relationship.  By being as 
transparent as possible in altering its deterrent—transparency both of material capability 
as well as the object of the deterrent—Washington may be able to allay Beijing’s fears of 
being the target of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. nuclear deterrence.  Both 
in terms of its nuclear arsenal as well as missile defense, Washington could take steps to 
reassure both Beijing and Tokyo: Beijing that missile defense is not intended to 
undermine its limited deterrent, and Tokyo that it will continue to fall under U.S. 
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protection until the last nuclear weapon is disabled.  This is no easy task; indeed, 
transparency could well undermine the credibility of the deterrent itself.  By revealing the 
exact composition of one’s strategic forces, an arms race may be sparked in the name of 
achieving nuclear parity; publically acknowledging the limitations of a BMD system 
might invite exploitation of those weaknesses. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan 
influenced the security relationship between China and Japan?  In the years since 1945 
this influence has varied in magnitude and direction.  In the endgame of World War II 
and in the formative years of the Cold War, the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons 
by the United States had a significant influence on the relationship between Japan and 
China, first ameliorating tensions by bringing the Pacific War to an end, later 
exacerbating tensions by driving Beijing to obtain its own nuclear weapons.  This 
influence of exacerbation was felt again, albeit in a more limited sense, with the advent of 
the Strategic Defense Initiative and its successor theater and national missile defense 
systems. 
The relationship between China and Japan, however, has undergone many more 
shifts, both in the long-term nature of being friends or enemies as well as the short-term 
condition of cooperation or conflict.  Most of these shifts, however, are unrelated to the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella or Japan’s participation in missile defense research and 
deployment.  As a result, the influence of Washington’s nuclear guarantee to Tokyo is 
best described as limited; in a few pointed instances it had some impact, but the greatest 
impact was felt when China and Japan were already on poor terms. 
This is not to say that the provision of extended deterrence by the United States is 
unimportant.  Indeed, the nuclear umbrella has been a small but important reason for 
Japan not obtaining its own strategic deterrent; a nuclear Japan would almost certainly 
lead to a nuclear arms race between Tokyo and Beijing akin to the Cold War competition 
between Washington and Moscow.  While the U.S. nuclear guarantee cannot by itself 
influence the Sino-Japanese security relationship, it should not be considered 
 97 
inconsequential.  To paraphrase President Obama, as long as there are nuclear weapons in 
the world, the United States must continue to deter nuclear attack on itself or its allies. 
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